

November 18, 2013 DIAL/ Fin-Acc/2013-14/3916

Ms.Radhika.R Jt. GM Airports Economic Regulatory Authority of India, AERA Building, Administrative Complex, Safdarjung Airport, New Delhi 110003



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Madam,

Sub: Response to comments submitted by various stakeholders on Consultation Paper 09/2013-14 FY doi 2-13

This is in reference to your letter no. AERA/20010/MYTP/HIAL/2011-12/VOL_IV/5091 dated 6th November, 2013 seeking response of GHIAL to various comments submitted by the stakeholders on Consultation Paper 09/2013-14.

Enclosed is our detailed response to comments of stakeholders forwarded by the Authority.

Please let us know if you need any further information or clarification.

Yours Sincerely,

For GMR Hyderabad International Airport Limited

Sidharath Kapur [President & CFO - Airports]



Enclosed are our responses to the comments/submissions from the following stakeholders:

- 1. Airport Authority of India (AAI)
- 2. Airport Council International (ACI)
- 3. Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry of India (ASSOCHAM)
- 4. Association of Private Airport Operators (APAO)
- 5. Blue Dart Aviation Ltd.

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- 6. Confederation of Indian Industry (CII)
- 7. Federation of Indian Airlines (FIA)
- 8. Federation of Indian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (FICCI)
- 9. International Air Transport Association (IATA)
- 10. Joint representation of Indian Oil Corp. Ltd.(IOCL), Bharat Petroleum Corp. Ltd. (BPCL) and Hindustan Petroleum Corp. Ltd. (HPCL)

14 	AAI Comments	GHIAL Response
	Comments of AAI are not final comments.	These do not seem to be final comments of AAI as they were sent to MoCA for the final viewpoint to be taken by MoCA before being forwarded to AERA. However we have responded to these draft comments/queries.
2	Investment and guiding principle of AERA	
	AERA has proposed to determine the tariff taking the Airport only as the single entity without taking into account its subsidiary in SEZ and hotel considering them as Non Airport activity. AERA need to define the airport activity and Non airport activity in view that the entire land has been acquired for airport.	 We had made filing wherein the subsidiaries were also included. However AERA has taken a viewpoint relating to exclusion of subsidiaries from tariff filing. As regards to land, the airport and Non airport activity is already defined in concession: on a conjoint reading of Section 13(1)(a)(vi) of the AERA Act read with Article 10.2 and 10.3 of the Concession Agreement mandates regulating the Regulated Charges as defined in the Concession Agreement and not regulate any Other Charges in respect of the facilities and services provided at the Airport nor using the revenue therefrom to subsidize the Aero Charges. The value of the land earmarked for Non-Airport Activities (market or notional) cannot be included in nor deducted from the RAB and accordingly the revenue generated therefrom cannot be taken into account for cross subsidizing aeronautical tariff at airport. In fact the GoAP had given the land on lease for two independent purposes i.e. (i) for Airport and (ii) For development of non-airport activities. The Section 13 of AERA Act defines the role of the Authority The scope is to regulate the Airport charges only not the Non-Airport activities.

	AAI Comments	GHIAL Response	
	It has not been stated whether HIAL	The project being greenfield there were no deposits	
	has received any interest free security	available at time of the construction of project. As such	
1	deposit from its concessionaire, which	no deposit can be used for the project.	
	has been used in the Project.		
3	Consideration of pre control period		
	loss.		
	AERA has proposed to consider the	This is on account of the shortfall of previous ad-hoc	
	carryover loss for the past period	determination by AERA.	
	while calculating the tariff for the first	AAI has concessioned the airports as PPPs and is under an	
	control period 2011-16.	obligation to ensure that the PPPs run on a viable and	
	AERA has to spell out the policy	profitable basis and the terms of the concession are	
	regarding carryover of loss from	adhered to.	
	previous control period or period prior	Consideration of only actual loss and not ARR means that no return will be allowed to the airport operator. This is a	
	to affective control period. It is felt that AERA should consider	wrong methodology and this will mean the airport	
	actual operational loss for the	operator will be not be entitled to any return on its	
1	previous periods instead of calculating	investments.	
	it on ARR method.	The pre control period losses are owing to the lower tariff	
		w.r.t the eligibility in terms of ARR in the previous period.	
		The charges were set on Adhoc terms only and were not a	
		permanent feature for the control period.	
	The consideration of loss effective	During the Ad-hoc UDF Order AERA has laid down as	
	2008 on ARR method implies shifting	under:	
	of control period effective 2008.		
		"The detailed comments of the Authority on the	
		issues raised by HIAL (as indicated in Para 18.1	
		above) are given in Annexure-II. Broadly, it is the	
		Authority's understanding that the aforesaid	
		differences are arising mainly as HIAL is taking	
ļ		2010-11 estimates as firm figures. It is reiterated	
		that the figures of 2010-11 are only estimates and	
		therefore, Authority proposes to continue with its	
		approach of taking actuals of 2009-10 to estimate	
		the figures in respect of 2010-11 and 2011-12 and 2012-13. After reconciliation the UDF rate has been	
ļ		worked out as Rs-430/-per domestic passenger	
		and Rs.1700/-per international passenger,	
		exclusive of service tax, on an ad-hoc basis w.e.f,	
		01.11.2010 (details at Annexure III). Authority is	
		conscious that on a detailed assessment, including	
		bottoms up analysis of all revenues and	
		expenditures, the UDF rates presently determined	
		may need to be altered. This exercise will be	
		undertaken at the final determination stage."	

	AAI Comments GHIAL Response	
		Accordingly this is in continuation of the earlier order of the Authority
6	Allocation of Asset	
	AERA has agreed to accept the principle proposed by HIAL to bifurcate the assets between Aeronautical and Non aeronautical asset. But it has stated that it proposed to undertake a study regarding the policy proposed by HIAL.	In proposal no. 3 of the CP 09/2013-14 the Authority has stated that it proposed to commission an independent study on allocation. Following is the extract from the CP: "The Authority also tentatively proposes that it will commission an independent study to assess the reasonableness of the asset allocation submitted by HIAL and would take corrective action, as may be necessary for determination of tariffs under dual till, at the commencement of the next control period commencing with effect from 01.04.2016."
	It is not clear whether the security assets procured through PSF (SC) have	Our analysis is based on scientific methodology adopted by us and we are open to its review by Authority. The classification methodology has been very clearly drafted vide a Concept Note and submitted to AERA. No assets procured from PSF funds are there in GHIAL books. A certificate from Auditors in this respect is already
	been excluded both from the aeronautical as well as non-aeronautical assets.	submitted to Authority
	It is also not clear whether the portion of the asset like electrical installation, water supply, roads etc. which also catered to its subsidiaries (non-Airport Activity) have been apportion to its subsidiary and deleted from the Airport list.	No assets which are capitalized in GHIAL RAB are exclusively used for subsidiaries. An Auditors certificate in this regard is already submitted to Authority
	It needs to be determined whether asset like ATC Tower, Technical Block has been funded through Government grant. If so, the effect has to be given in RAB on this asset. Moreover, in case Dual Till is considered, the classification of this asset in aeronautical or non-aeronautical is to be determined.	There is no grant received form Govt exclusively for ATC. Auditor's Certificates requested by AERA for the ATC assets and usage of assets have been provided.
7	Future Capital Expenditure	

The general capital expenditure proposed during the period of 5 years	The items being listed as capital in nature are capital
seems to contain a number of works like modification of security hold area, modification of old duty free space which are revenue in nature and if so, needs to be deleted from the capital expenditure and RAB	assets and not revenue assets as being referred herein. Capitalization will be scrutinized by Auditors before they allow the same to be approved. Modification does not mean that this is opex. If any item is considered as opex the same will be allowed as opex by Statutory Auditors and will accordingly be trued up.
The Govt. of Andhra Pradesh (GoAP) has given the land at concessional rate and no rent is to be paid during first 8 years. It needs to be examined whether the cost of the land in respect of Airport is to be included in the RAB for the first control period.	The cost of the Land is not part of GHIAL's RAB.
Some of the assets at the Airport may be utilized for subsidiary like SEZ or hotel (non-Airport Activity). All such assets should be identified and deleted (100 % or proportionately) as utilized for the subsidiary.	No assets which are capitalized in GHIAL RAB are exclusively used for subsidiaries. Also the allocation methodologies of common areas (where common areas are allocated based on pure aero and non-aero areas) ensure that the proportionate allocation amongst aero and non-aero is there for common assets. A certificate from Statutory auditors in this regard has
All assets created out of nonrefundable grant given by GoAP should be identified and deleted from RAB. Further depreciation on such assets is to be adjusted. In case it cannot be identified the same has to be deleted proportionately over all	already been furnished to Authority. It is not possible to identify specific assets funded throug Advance Development fund grant (ADFG) of Rs. 10 Crores given by GoAP. However, value of Rs. 107 Crore has been excluded from the gross assets base of GHIAL fo calculation of Yield Per Pax. RAB and the correspondin depreciation also have been reduced accordingly.
assets.	
The rate in respect of debt needs to be analyzed and fixed with reference to present interest rate with option of truing up the rate.	Truing up of cost of debt leaves no scope for operator to innovate and make saving in the interest cost, whereas the upper cap makes the business riskier. We request the Authority to approve an interest cost on RTL borrowings @ 12.5% and ECB @ 8.68% with no true up. RBI also has recently hiked the key interest rate
	needs to be deleted from the capital expenditure and RAB The Govt. of Andhra Pradesh (GoAP) has given the land at concessional rate and no rent is to be paid during first 8 years. It needs to be examined whether the cost of the land in respect of Airport is to be included in the RAB for the first control period. Some of the assets at the Airport may be utilized for subsidiary like SEZ or hotel (non-Airport Activity). All such assets should be identified and deleted (100 % or proportionately) as utilized for the subsidiary. All assets created out of nonrefundable grant given by GoAP should be identified and deleted from RAB. Further depreciation on such assets is to be adjusted. In case it cannot be identified the same has to be deleted proportionately over all assets. Cost of Debt The rate in respect of debt needs to be analyzed and fixed with reference to present interest rate with option of

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	AAI Comments	GHIAL Response	
1. SI		FINANCIAL TIMES	
		October 29, 2013 11:31 am	
		India raises interest rates to combat inflation	
		By Amy Kazmin in New Delhi India's central bank has raised its key interest rates by 25	
		basis points to 7.75 per cent in an effort to tackle rising	
		inflation, a move that Raghuram Rajan, the governor, said	
		was critical to maintain the stability needed for faster growth.	
1		http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/da22f582-4060-11e3-a39b-	
		00144feabdc0.html#axzz2jpx2SLIJ	
		Further in future also RBI is likely to hike rates in view of the current inflation. A report from standard chartered	
		bank in this regards confirms our stand of interest rate	
		hike in future:	
		Standard Sciences	
		Economic Alert 29 October 2013 India – RBI likely to hike more	
		RBI hikes repo rate, cuts MSF and announces	
		liquidity-enhancing measures, in line with expectations	
		 Given RBI's focus on inflation, we expect another 	
		25bps repo rate hike at the next policy meeting.	
10	Cost of Equity		
	GMR, Hyderabad has stated that cost of equity should be determined taking	There cannot be two principles one used for privatization and the second to be applied after he has invested in	
	into account the concession	project.	
	agreement rate of minimum 18.5 %	Government of AP has clarified to the Authority and has	
	and risk involved. AAI feels that there are various methods and policies to	reiterating clause 2.3 (b) (i) of the SSA which mandates maintaining minimum internal rate of return on equity at	
	determine the cost of capital. AERA	18.33%.	
	has to take its decision on this matter.	As per the study conducted by us on Cost of Equity, the	
		return allowed should be 24% The rates proposed by MoCA were in range of 18.5% to	
		20.5% for Indian airports.	

120	AAI Comments	GHIAL Response
	It is felt that the cost of equity should	It will not be correct to assume that the cost of equity to
	be more or less same for all the	be same at all airports as there is only one airport. By this
	airports due to the fact that at all	logic the return across the world also should be one only.
	places there is only one Airport and	The cost of equity may or may not be same for all the
	economic scenario and factors	major airports as the risk profile is different of all airports.
	affecting the Aviation Industry is	major an ports as the risk prome is unrefere of an an ports.
	almost the Same at all places.	SBI CAPS has proposed a range (of cost of equity) between
	annost the same at an places.	18.5% to 20.5% for airports in India. This goes on to show
		that the rate of return could be in a range but not same
		for all.
		Risk profile of government owned airports and PPP
		airports may be quite different.
	It is not specified whether any internal	Wherever internal accrual will be available the same are
	accrual has been utilized for	considered for funding the future Capex.
	construction of the project.	
11	WACC	
	WACC needs to be determined after	The debts of GHIAL and debts of subsidiaries are different
	taking into account the amount of	The Authority has taken into consideration of this fact and
	debt utilized by HIAL towards	accordingly has adjusted debt for determination of tariff.
	formation of SEZ and Hotel business.	
	The HIAL has stated that the SEZ and	
	Hotel has mainly been finalized	
	through debt and internal accrual.	
	The amount of internal accrual (which	Internal accrual to the extent used for project need to get
	has the same nature of equity) needs	return equivalent to equity return.
	to be determined and decided	There is no logic of the same being excluded from equity.
	whether to reduce it from the equity	
	involved in the Airport.	
12	Depreciation	
	The AERA has proposed to charge	The scrap whenever sold will be netted off from asset
	depreciation on 100 % of the asset. It	value.
	is not clear that the treatment given in	The Depreciation allowed by AERA is primarily for the
	respect of scrap /residual value of the	purpose of Building Blocks and not for the Books.
	asset after the life time.	
13	Operating Expenses	
	Any operating expenses relating to the	The Authority has taken into consideration of this fact and
	common asset used by the non-airport	accordingly has adjusted expenses for determination of
L I	services and security is to be	tariff. The opex is classified amongst Aero and Non Aero.
	proportionately deleted.	However in single till all expenses are to be allowed.
		In case of Dual Till the appropriate allocation exercise has
1		been done.
		peen done.

	AAI Comments	GHIAL Response
		All Users of Common Assets have a business relationship with the Airport either directly or indirectly. The Users pay either directly/ indirectly for such usage in the medium of charges, rents etc. This income is accounted in GHIAL's books and the same is considered during the tariff determination.
14	Taxation and non-aeronautical revenue	
	The treatment of commercial revenue inside the Terminal Building should be	This statement is not based on rationale.
	treated as aeronautical revenue as Terminal Bldg. is mostly treated as aeronautical asset .	The commercial revenue generated within the terminal building cannot be classified at aero just because it is being earned within the terminal building.
		The portion of building used for non-aero is classified as non-aero and as such the non-aero revenue will remain to be non-aero.
		It will be wrong to treat commercial revenue inside the terminal as aeronautical revenue on plea that terminal building is mostly aeronautical.
		The Terminal Building is not treated completely as an aeronautical asset. The area has been split into non- aeronautical asset also based on floor space usage as explained in the Concept Note of Asset allocation methodology.
15	Treatment of Cargo, ground handling and Fuel	
	The AERA has proposed to include the cargo and Fuel dispenses activity in the aeronautical services. However, it has proposed to treat ground handling as non-aeronautical services, This aspect needs to be re-examined.	Cargo and Fuel are not regulated activities as per the concession agreement. Section 13(1)(a)(vi) of the AERA Act read with Article 10.2 and 10.3 of the Concession Agreement mandates regulating the Regulated Charges as defined in the Concession Agreement.
	In the Consultation Paper ground handling has been treated as non- aeronautical revenue. In case of Single Till there is no effect on this subject.	As such the Authority is not mandated to regulate any Other Charges in respect of the facilities and services provided at the Airport. Cargo, Fuel and Ground Handling should be outside the
	However, in case of Dual Till, the classification of some assets Like Conveyor Belt, Baggage Claim Area used for ground handling activity into	regulations. GoAP also has clarified that Cargo, Ground Handling and Fuel should not be regulated. GHIAL has accordingly classified Cargo assets as non-aero and the revenue
CPO	9/2013-14 (01.04.2011 - 31.03.2016)	

	AAI Comments	GHIAL Response
	aeronautical and non-aeronautical	therefrom also has been classified as non-aero. In our
	needs to be determined.	view this is what is contemplated under the Concession
		Agreement and the same is requested to be accepted by
		the Authority.
[As regards to the baggage claim area etc. it is wrongly
		being termed as ground handling assets as these are pure aero assets and in books of GHIAL.
		The assets such as Conveyor Belt and Baggage Claim Area
		are not Ground Handling assets. They are aeronautical
		assets and the same will not impact the Dual Till
		calculations.
		The Auditor's certificate has been provided clarifying the
16	Traffic forecast.	same
10	The HIAL had projected a negative	This will have no bearing while tariff determination as the
	growth in aircraft movement and	Authority has proposed to allow complete true up for
	passenger movement for 12-13 and nil	traffic
	growth for 13-14. The growth of 13-14	
	needs to be analyzed with respect to	
	the aircraft movement and passenger	
	movement with reference to the first	
	quarter of 13-14.	
17	Inflation and calculation of WPI -No	
	comments.	
18	Sensitivity analysis.	
[]	The AERA has calculated YPP in	no comments
	respect of Hyderabad Airport with the various policies and conditions stated	
ſ	by them in the consultation paper. We	
	are unable to comment in absence of	
	detailed traffic statistics and factors	
	considered for calculation of YPP.	
19	Tariff structure	
	HIAL has proposed UDF both for	We have proposed such an innovative rate card so that it
	domestic and international arrival and	may boost traffic throughput from RGI Airport.
	the departing passengers. It has also	
	proposed different rates for metro	As regards to discount we will request Authority to have a
	cities and non metro cities in respect	relook at not allowing the same. A discount on timely
	of domestic passengers and SAARC	payment and discounts to promote growth of traffic are
	countries and other countries in	for overall benefit to users.

CP 09/2013-14 (01.04.2011 – 31.03.2016) Determination of Aeronautical Tariff of Rajiv Gandhi International Airport, Shamshabad, Hyderabad

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(And	AAI Comments	GHIAL Response
	respect of international passengers.	Without these there is no innovation left in industry and
		finically also the industry may face problem of bad debts and industry getting into a sick mode.
	AERA in its consultation paper had stated that it proposed to levy UDF only on departing passengers, domestic and international as the concession agreement between HIAL	
	and Govt . of Andhra Pradesh specifies UDF only on departing passengers which seems to be in order.	
	AERA has proposed UDF under two conditions -(i) with existing airport charges and (ii) with increase in airport charges as proposed by HIAL.	
	AERA may specify the policy regarding revenue to be recovered from passenger through UDF and amount of revenue to be recovered from Airline	
	through airport charges (Proportionate). AERA has not specified whether the	
	Govt. directive/policy on Aeronautical charges like discount on small aircraft rates for Flying Club etc. will be	
	applicable to the operator.	
20	Till System It is felt that the till method should be	
	determined taking the following factors into consideration:	
	i) Economy of the aviation sector.	The concession agreement is the most sacrosanct based
	ii) The load/burden on Air passengers.	on which all the developments and investments were
	iii) The return to be provided to the operator.	made. Concession also predates the AERA Act.
	iv) Any agreement between G.O.I and the Airport Operator, if methodology	The Concession Agreement mandates regulating the
	is specified in the agreement.	

A	AAI Comments	GHIAL Response
C E O b	v) Exclusivity provision reduces risk in operation/revenue generation. vi) Existing Airport closed for Commercial operation in public interest and benefit must accrue to public at large by lowering charges	Regulated Charges as defined in the Concession Agreement and not regulates any Other Charges in respect of the facilities and services provided at the Airport nor using the revenue therefrom to subsidize the Aero Charges. So, TILL envisaged in the Concession Agreement is Dual Till and we earnestly request the Authority to abide by the Concession Agreement
	AAI has been following the principles of Single Till due to following factors:	The provisions of the Concession Agreement cannot be denied on the grounds that it is difficult to allocate capital expenditure and operating expenditure.
b is b) Difficulty in allocation of asset between aero and non aero activity. It s also difficult to classify some assets between ANS and aero activities.	We had presented to Authority at various forums the fact that the privatization and single till do not go hand in hand
t R	 i) Single till is more simplified and transparent. iii) It harmonizes the Revenue & Expenditure of Aero and non aero activities avoiding confusion and avoid various assumptions. 	Various examples in this regard have also been submitted to Authority.
iv a h tl	v) It helps to keep the aero and non aero charges lower and thereby helping the passenger and Airlines in he present socio-economic condition of India.	
s d a	It also follows the principles of cross subsiding the aero charges and development of Airport through non- nero activities. vi) The rate fixed for hero charges are on cost plus basis.	
Р р л у g	Previously there was no fixed policy/formulae for determining the Aeronautical charges . The charges were low and stress/incentive waS given on non-aeronautical Revenue to make the Airport viable .	

ACI comments	GHIAL Response
Form of regulation:	
AERA has mandated single till regulation as the preferred mode of	We appreciate the detailed
regulation for Hyderabad Airport. The most controversial decision on	analysis carried by ACI and shall
part of regulators worldwide is the treatment of non-aeronautical	request the Authority to adopt a
revenues. In particular, whether those revenues, or at least the profit	Dual Till Regulation for GHIAL
from those revenues, should contribute to aeronautical costs. This is	based on the principles
commonly referred to as single till vs. dual till regulation.	contemplated in concession
ACI believes that the dual till principle is the most economically	agreement.
sound argument in the regulatory till debate.	
The main arguments put forward in favour of dual till are:	
Regulation should be applied only to those areas of airport activity	
where there is the potential for excess market power. This is not the	
case in regards to non-aeronautical revenues, where airport can face	
competition from a wide of alternative providers (e.g., "high	
street" shops and restaurants for retail and food & beverage,	
third party parking providers near airports, etc.).	
Niemeier (2009) argues that it is passenger spending and not airlines	
that create non-aeronautical revenues and therefore the airlines	
have no automatic entitlement to benefit from these revenues.	
Furthermore, while dual till may result in higher aeronautical	
charges, regulation should not try to regulate profits directly as this	
reduces incentives for cost savings from which the airlines also gain,	
especially in the long run. Starkie (2001) argues that dual till significantly reduces the likelihood	
that airports will exploit any market power they may have, as	
airports will be incentivised to keep aeronautical charges lower in	
order to maximise unregulated commercial revenues (airports as	
two-sided platforms – see Section 2.4).	
Dual till pricing increases incentives to invest in airport facilities,	
thereby encouraging investment and increasing capacity. Under	
single till, any gains in non-aeronautical revenues flow through to	
reductions in aeronautical charges. Therefore, airports have little	
incentive to invest in capacity either to increase traffic (as	
aeronautical investment would do) or increase non-aeronautical	
revenues (through investment in commercial capacity). Dual till	
avoids this distortion. However, the UK Competition Commission	
considered the application of dual till for regulated London airports	
(Heathrow, Gatwick and Stansted), and determined that there was	
no evidence of under-investment that resulted due to the single till	
method applied to the London airports. The Commission also stated	
that it was unclear whether dual till would lead to better	
aeronautical investment in the future. In their view, dual till could	
be inferior to single till, unduly favouring commercial investment	

ACI comments	GHIAL Response
where financial constraints exist.3 Starkie (2002) criticised the logic	
of the Competition Commission decision, as well as its failure to fully	
consider congestion issues at the London airports.	
Another limitation of the single till approach is that aeronautical	
charges are not set according to economic principles when there are	
congested conditions. This can increase congestion at an airport that	
is nearing capacity. Since aeronautical fees are reduced by net non-	
aeronautical revenues, the prices charged to airline users for landing	
and the use of the terminal are lower than their economic and social	
costs. Starkie and Yarrow (2001) argue that single till exacerbates this	
problem of stimulating more congestion - as greater numbers of	
passengers are squeezed into congested facilities, commercial	
revenues will rise, resulting in further declines in aeronautical fees	
(all else being equal), which encourages more airline service to the	
now lower priced airport. So under conditions whereby rising	
charges should be required in order to ration capacity and incentivise	
investment, the exact opposite occurs. Thus, dual till is preferable at	
airports under conditions of congestion. Yang and Zhang (2011) also	
argues that dual till regulation yields higher welfare at	
significantly congested airports.	
The additional income from non-aeronautical revenue is essential for	
favourable credit ratings and the airport's ability to attract investors,	
private or public (and the associated financing of large infrastructure	
projects). Without control over these revenues, airports would be	
considered less attractive investments, reducing their ability to	
obtain low cost financing. Ultimately, this benefits airlines, at it	
reduces the costs of capital improvements.	
Bel and Fageda (2010), based on airport charges at 100 airports in	
Europe, found no statistical difference between the single till and	
dual till on the overall level of charges.	
Adler and Liebert (2012) examined the cost efficiency and charges of	
European and Australian airports over a 10 year period.8 The analysis	
found that dual till produced greater cost efficiencies than single till]
and that dual till results in higher charges at congested airport (than	
single till) but lower charges at uncongested airports, the latter	
result supporting the arguments of Starkie (2001) regarding	
dual_till restraining market power.	
The issue of single till vs. dual till continues to generate considerable	
debate However the empirical evidence suggests that the	
conception that single till airports are cheaper do not entirely hold	
true	

ACI comments	GHIAL Response
Also important is the fact the state had contemplated a Dual Till regulation of Hyderabad in the concession agreement. As such the regulator must respect the concession agreement and adopt a Dual Till form of regulation rather than a single till regulation.	
ICAO's Stance on Till	
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) is a United Nations agency responsible for promoting the safe and orderly development of international civil aviation throughout the world. It sets standards and regulations necessary for aviation safety, security, efficiency and regularity, as well as for aviation environmental protection.	We appreciate the detailed analysis carried by ACI and shall request the Authority to adopt a Dual Till Regulation for GHIAL. This is based on the principles contemplated in concession
ICAO's recommended policies for airport pricing are set out in "ICAO's Policies on Charges for Airports and Air Navigation Services", Document 9082, Ninth Edition, 2012.9 The document does not recommend that economic regulation of airports be always applied nor does it specify a particular format of regulation. It does state that any such economic regulation (referred to as economic oversight) should match the specific circumstances in each country state, including degree of competition, balance of cost and benefits of oversight and institutional framework, and should be clearly separated from the operation and provision of airport (and air navigation) services. This economic oversight should seek to minimise the risk of market power abuses, ensure transparent and non- discriminatory pricing, encourage cost-effective investment, and balance the interests of passengers and other users with those of the airport (or air navigation provider).	agreement.
In regards to the setting of airport charges, Document 9082 encourages States to incorporate in their national legislation the four key charging principles of: non- discrimination, cost-relatedness, transparency, and consultation. However, it is neutral as to whether non-aeronautical revenues should subsidize aeronautical charges:	
"The cost to be allocated is the full cost of providing the airport and its essential ancillary services, including appropriate amounts for cost of capital and depreciation of assets, as well as the costs of maintenance, operation, management and administration. Consistent with the form of economic oversight adopted, these costs may be offset by non- aeronautical revenues." (Page II-1; emphasis added).	
In other words, ICAO does not provide a recommendation for the application of single or dual till pricing.	
In case of Hyderabad since the agreement signed with state stipulate a Dual till and the act puts responsibility on the regulator to abide by the concession a Dual Till need to be adopted.	

Cost of Capital The rate of return on capital needs to be sufficient to maintain adequate investment in the airport over the life time of the assets,	The 18.33% was the minimum Equity IRR (equivalent to Cost of
	Equity IRR (equivalent to Cost of
	Equity of 24%) promised at time
and results in airport charges which further users' reasonable	of award of concession.
interests.11	
	Non Adherence to this leads to a
One common approach is to estimate the Weighted Average Cost of	noncompliance to a sovereign
Capital	agreement.
(WACC) which involves weighting together the cost of debt and cost	
of equity:	As such it is earnestly requested
	that a minimum Equity IRR of
(Pre-tax) WACC = g x rd + (1 - g) x re	18.33% is maintained
	-
Where g is the gearing ratio (net debt/total value), rd is the return	4
required on debt; and <i>re</i> is the return required on equity. The	
required return on debt is generally assessed based on the airport's	
credit rating (i.e., the typical interest rate charged to companies with	
similar credit ratings and debt levels).	
Another common approach to determining the return on equity is via	
using the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), which is based on the	
risk free rate, the equity risk premium (ERP) for the market as a	
whole, and the company-specific risk parameter (the beta):12	
re = Risk Free Rate + beta x ERP	•
The base is this secretion is a secret of the sidily of the first is	-
The beta in this equation is a measure of the riskiness of the firm in	
question relative to some asset benchmark (e.g., the stock market). Firms that exhibit a beta of more than 1 can be considered more	
risky than the asset benchmark, while a beta of less than 1 are less	
risky than the asset benchmark. The riskier an asset, the higher	
return that investors will require on their investment. In the case of a airports, the beta involves considerations not only of how risky the	
airport industry is relative to other industries, but also how risky a particular airport is relative to its peers, often based in part on the	
volatility of traffic at the individual airport. The decision of the	
· ·	
requistor on the sharonriste bets for a particular support can	
regulator on the appropriate beta for a particular airport can significantly affect the return charged on capital investments, and the ability of the airport to raise financing.	

ACI comments	GHIAL Response
Given their importance, the calculation of the WACC and its	
constituent parts can require considerable analysis and research. <u>A</u>	-
permitted WACC set too low can result in delayed or inadequate	
investment, as investors seek higher returns elsewhere, while a	ļ
WACC set too high can result in customers paying prices higher than	
would occur in a competitive market.	
The values are normally set at the start of the regulatory period	1
based on market conditions at the time, and remain fixed	
throughout. This can result in the airport achieving returns above or	
below the WACC (for example if market interest rates decline or	}
increase after the regulatory decision). Airports can also potentially	
attempt to achieve higher return by selecting a gearing ratio]
different to the regulator's which provides a lower cost of capital. To	
avoid perceived "windfall" gains from such activities, some	
regulators have sought to address this by selecting a projected or	
optimal gearing ratio rather than relying on historical values.	
The concession agreement of Hyderabad airport contemplates an	
Equity IRR of minimum of 18.33%. This should be the minimum that	
the regulator must allow for Hyderabad airport to ensure:	
1 The sovereign agreement is honored	~
Service Quality	·
A number of approaches have been suggested and attempted. These	1
include quality monitoring without financial penalty, financial fines or	ļ
user rebates for failing to meet certain service quality targets, or	
incorporating service quality into the price cap itself could be	
reduced by subtracting a service quality factor, q:	
Price cap = $CPI - X - q$	1
The service quality factor q would be based on specified	1
metrics regarding service quality (e.g., queue times, cleanliness,	
delays, etc.). Thus, the price cap would be adjusted downward in a	1
later year if the airport failed to achieve to certain service quality	
targets in a given year (or possibly adjusted upwards if it exceeded	
the targets).	
Issues Associated with Service Quality Regulation	In terms of the AERA Act it is
There are a number of issues associated with the regulation of	clear that the role and
service quality within the broader economic regulation of an airport:	jurisdiction of the Authority is
	limited to monitoring

ACI comments	GHIAL Response
These targets and metrics are inflexible – the regulated entity cannot respond to changing market conditions or evolving customer needs and wants. In many cases, different customers have different needs and wants – service quality regimes typically do not have the ability to cater for different passenger groups.	compliance of the service quality standards prescribed under the concession agreement. The prescription of any new services standards is not envisaged.
Service quality levels are often facilitated by allowed operating and capital costs, which within a regulatory determination are often influenced by airlines. This can lead to a tension between the requirement to meet certain service quality standards and the approval of the operating and capital resources required to reach these standards.	While Section 13(1)(a)(ii) of the AERA Act permits the Authority to consider the services provided, its quality and other relevant factors in determining the tariff, there is no explicit
The consequences of service quality schemes are not always symmetrical - if the airport underperforms it is penalised, but if it over performs it is not rewarded. The service quality regulation should to provide symmetrical incentives – rewarding overachievement as well as penalising under achievement.	power vested with the Authority to prescribe any penalties under the AERA Act in the event of a failure to meet service quality requirements.
Service quality at an airport depends upon cooperation between many different players – primarily airlines, airport and ground handlers, but also government services, surface transport providers, retailers, etc. Service quality regimes are generally imposed upon airports only,	In view of the Authority being required to take the terms of the concession agreement into consideration for determining tariff and in view of the concession agreement already providing for a mechanism for
dulling the incentives of other parties to cooperate in improving the passenger experience. At a minimum, service quality schemes should only cover areas where the airport has direct control and responsibility (e.g., security screening queue times) and not areas where other parties have influence.	penalties for failure to achieve service quality requirements, the Authority should not only take into consideration the service quality requirements, but also the penalties for failure
As service quality at an airport depends upon cooperation between different players, regulators should consider schemes such as at Copenhagen Airport, where the airport, airlines and handlers are incentivised to work together, with the airport shouldering most responsibility.	to meet service quality requirements as set forth therein. Any penalties prescribed by the Authority for failure to meet the said service quality requirements would effectively tantamount to the
We understand that the AERA act contemplates a monitoring of the performance standards with no penal provisions. As such AERA must monitor the performance standards and in case of any violations can report the same for penal provisions as signed with the state.	Authority not taking into consideration the terms (including penalties) of the Concession Agreements and therefore would not be

ACI comments	GHIAL Response
	consistent with the AERA Act
We shall also recommend for an incentive scheme if the quality	Therefore, Authority is
levels are exceeded.	requested not to impose
	additional standards and
	penalties over and above those
	enumerated in the CA.
	Additional quality parameters,
	maintaining these standards,
	and monitoring requires
	additional capital and operating
	expenditure. The same needs to
	be allowed over and above the
	amounts allowed by Authority.
	As such the Authority is
	requested to continue with the
	methodology as prescribed
	under Concession Agreements
	for compliance, monitoring and
	penalties for non-conformity.
Land usage and the treatment	
AERA has contemplated a unique model of the treatment of land at	ACI has very well pointed out
Hyderabad airport. This kind of treatment has never been	the lacuna in the proposed
contemplated in any of the regulatory regimes in world.	treatment of land by the
The reduction of market value of Land from RAB, (when it's not	Authority. This kind of
existing in the	mechanism is not followed
RAB at first place) is a treatment never done in any regulatory	anywhere across the globe.
regime.	
AERA itself has confirmed that in normal course the land should be	On a conjoint reading of Section
outside the regulation:	13(1)(a)(vi) of the AERA Act read
"3.9. The real estate development by the airport operator through	with Article 10.2 and 10.3 of the
commercial exploitation of land leased or granted to it, which is in	Concession Agreement
excess of the airport requirement, would normally be outside the RAB	mandates regulating the
boundary. This means that the revenues from commercial	Regulated Charges as defined in
exploitation of such lands would, in normal course, not enter into the	the Concession Agreement and
calculation of revenues required for aeronautical tariff	not regulate any Other Charges
determination."	in respect of the facilities and
This is a clear admittance on part of AERA that the Land should be	services provided at the Airport nor using the revenue
outside the regulations.	therefrom to subsidize the Aero
The concession agreements signed by Hyderabad airport also did not	
contemplate this kind of treatment and we understand that since	Charges.
this land is outside the airport it is also outside the regulatory	The value of the land earmarked
jurisdiction of AERA.	

ACI comments	GHIAL Response
As such we shall request AERA to keep the land outside regulation. AERA should not reduce market value of land from RAB nor do cross subsidize revenues accruing thereto.	for Non-Airport Activities (market or notional) cannot be included in nor deducted from the RAB and accordingly the revenue generated therefrom cannot be taken into account for cross subsidizing aeronautical tariff at airport.

Regulatory decisions must take a Macro View and think of long term benefit of airlines and passengers:We are of the view that the short term vision wherein the charges will getBetter infrastructure has many advantages. In airports, lower turnaround time and fuel saving at better airports have far greater saving than lowering airport charges. Investments in capacity constrained airports result in several benefits for the airlines.We are of the view that the short term vision wherein the charges will get lowered by strangulating the investor can be counterproductive to the end user in long term.Better airports will result in lesser delays in landing and taking off and ensuring quicker turnarounds, which in return reduces manpower and fuel costs for airlines. This in turn will mean a lower cost to consumer.An unattractive return will mean that the investor will not be interested in investing in the infrastructure of airport. The investor has many parallel investing in the infrastructure of airport. The investor has many parallel investing in this sector.However low charges (by inadequate return to investor) will result in lower investment by private sector. This will lead to capacity constraints and inefficient operations. The quality of service and efficiency of Indian airports now is a benchmark for the world. London Mayor had visited India and was all praise for Hyderabad Airport. To quote a news article on this (Source: Hindu)This will mean that traveller will be subject to poor infrastructure.We have be to be the top will the part of the view that the	ASSOCHAM Comments	GHIAL Response
 Hyderabad, Delhi airports floor London Mayor Boris Hyderabad and Delhi airports are top class. Waxing eloquent on the Rajiv Gandhi International Airport in the city, London Mayor Boris Johnson said a similar airport would be built in East London. He said London needed to catch up with India when it comes to aviation capacity. India now is on world stage and the next era belongs to India. Let this start not be nipped in bud. 	Regulatory decisions must take a Macro View and think of long term benefit of airlines and passengers: Better infrastructure has many advantages. In airports, lower turnaround time and fuel saving at better airports have far greater saving than lowering airport charges. Investments in capacity constrained airports result in several benefits for the airlines. Better airports will result in lesser delays in landing and taking off and ensuring quicker turnarounds, which in return reduces manpower and fuel costs for airlines. This in turn will mean a lower cost to consumer. However low charges (by inadequate return to investor) will result in lower investment by private sector. This will lead to capacity constraints and inefficient operations. The quality of service and efficiency of Indian airports now is a benchmark for the world. London Mayor had visited India and was all praise for Hyderabad Airport. To quote a news article on this (Source: Hindu) Hyderabad, Delhi airports floor London Mayor Boris Hyderabad and Delhi airports are top class. Waxing eloquent on the Rajiv Gandhi International Airport in the city, London Mayor Boris Johnson said a similar airport would be built in East London. He said London needed to catch up with India when it comes to aviation capacity. India now is on world stage and the next era belongs to India.	We are of the view that the short term vision wherein the charges will get lowered by strangulating the investor can be counterproductive to the end user in long term. An unattractive return will mean that the investor will not be interested in investing in the infrastructure of airport. The investor has many parallel investment opportunities and a lower return means that he will avoid investing in this sector. This will mean that the quality level will suffer at airport. This will mean that traveller will be subject to poor infrastructure. Airlines will get congested airports leading to huge waiting and hovering time adding to their costs. The economy of the country will suffer

ASSOCHAM Comments	GHIAL Response
Nurturing of Industry	
	There is a support needed from the
Airport regulatory oversight will decide on whether industry is	Govt and the regulators to ensure that
nurtured or killed. Given proper incentives Indian airports will	India do not lose out on the
become hubs. Airport hubs development will mean greater	opportunities.
traffic and lower cost to consumer-One of the first results of	
privatization will be in developing intemational airports as	
hubs, modeled around successful commercial airports like	
Changi, Dubai and Frankfurt. Uncompetitive charges can	
deflect traffic to neighboring hubs, thereby causing more harm	
than good to the operator. Thus, an airport operator will	
systematically mind the prices on the aeronautical side.	
Development of hubs is also likely to benefit the airlines in the	(
future.	
The race to create hub will itself ensure competitive pricing:	
The percentage of nonaeronautical revenues in Indian airports	
is extremely low (around 30%), whereas developed airports	
around the world earn a high percentage of revenues from this	
category. Indian airports are vying to be international hubs.	
However if the non-aerorevenue is regulated it will result in	
killing of the segment. While, India had witnessed a period of high passenger growth, the economic recession that followed	
has imposed severe risks on the investors.	
Airports are lumpy investment and lack flexibility and this	Following are results of some of the
special characteristic should be kept in mind	studies carried out by various experts
Airports are for long term and sunk costs with no flexibility	on cost of equity. These are very
available. Airports, as lumpy investments can only be forward-	established organizations of national
looking and need to plan for the future which is very uncertain.	and international repute. These
In the Indian scenario, airport supply had always lagged	studies were carried out on behalf of
demand, causing severe constraints in service quality and	the Airports, the industry associations
therefore, adequate capacity planning should be seen as a	as well as MoCA, GOI. However the
welcome change. Airport planning is not only governed by	report of NIPFP relied by Authority
demand, but also by the specific elements in the concession	have no such experience. The
agreements that have been signed with the authorities that	resultant number of NIPFP is nowhere
mandate stringent capacity requirements, meeting which	near the estimates of these reports.
involves heavy investments that are in-eversible.	
	Cost of Equity
With such uncertainties in mind there are a lot of risks and	Jacobs 24%
uncertainties associated with this sector compared to other	KPMG (for APAO) 20%-25%
utility sectors such as electricity. As such the investor in	based on debt equity ratio.
segment needs to be adequately compensated to remain	SBI Caps (For MoCA/AAI) 18.5% to
invested in the sector.	20.5%
	CRISIL (For MIAL) 18.16 to 20.44 %

ASSOCHAM Comments	GHIAL Response
	based on debt equity ratio.
	NIPFP 13.2%
Planning Commission Indian Infrastructure sector required USD 1 trillion of	Cost of Equity proposed by the Authority is very low and we request the Authority to reconsider the same. The investment envisaged by Planning commission could be met only with
investments in the is'" Five-Year Plan. The Finance Minister has	right kind of incentive to the sector.
sought a greater degree of involvement of foreign investors in	0
his meeting with the leaders of Fortune 500 companies at a	Its earnestly requested that the
meet recently. The Minister has assured foreign investors that	Authority must:
India has evolved a transparent and stable regulatory regime	1. Allow a Dual Till
across various sectors including uirports.	Allow a return on Equity of
Planning commission expects USD 500 bn (or 50% of total)	24%
capital from private players in next 5-year plan period (I2'h Plan). In sectors such as aviation, the contribution is expected	 Keep Regulating charges as contemplated in concession
to be even higher at approximately 75%. Estimates received	4. Keep the incentives given in
from AAI and the industry indicate that the Indian airports	the concession intact including
would require an investment of about Rs.67,500 crores during	treatment of land.
the 12th Five Year Plan of which around Rs.50,000 crores is	
likely to be contributed by the private sector.	
Hence preserving the interest of investors becomes the prime	
importance, to achieve future growth in Infrastructure which is	
a key enabler for all other industries.	

ASSOCHAM Comments	GHIAL Response
Return on Equity One of the most critical aspects that would define success of the ambitious plan would be the rate of return on the capital deployed by private players on their investments across different sector, commensurate to the risk taken. Any indication that the returns to the investors in the future would be sub-optimal will be disastrous for the investment climate for private participation in PPP. Government will need to ensure a fair return, especially in sectors that are regulated. Specifically on airports, they are often perceived as more risky than other infrastructure sectors like power, ports, roads, etc. Aviation sector is cyclical in nature and the degree of severity or volatility in cash flows is higher. We understand that the concession agreement envisaged a minimum IRR of 18.33% on equity. This minimum should not be breached as proposed by Authority. Even Ministry of Civil Aviation (MoCA) has recommended return on equity in the range of 18.5% to 20.5% based on the report of SBI Caps. Current proposed rate of 16% in the consultation paper is lower than the recommendation of MoCA.	 The minimum equity IRR of 18.33% promised under the GO No.130 dated July 26, 2013 issued by GoAP and the State Support Agreement is integral to the concession The Authority is requested not to alter or vary the assurance of minimum 18.33% Equity IRR granted to GHIAL. Also the following are results of some of the studies carried out by various experts on cost of equity. These are very established organizations of national and international repute. These studies were carried out on behalf of the Airports, the industry associations as well as MoCA, GOI. However the report of NIPFP relied by Authority have no such experience. The resultant number of NIPFP is nowhere near the estimates of these reports. Cost of Equity Jacobs 24% KPMG (for APAO) 20%-25% based on debt equity ratio. SBI Caps (Study for MoCA/AAI) 18.5% to 20.5% CRISIL (For MIAL) 18.16 to 20.44% based on debt equity ratio.
Concession Agreement	NIPFP 13.2% The concession agreement laid down
Concession agreement is the prime agreement based on which all the business decision were made at the time of taking up the project. Any change in interpretation of the concession document post facto will send wrong signal to the investor community and will be impediment in growth in the aviation sector. Concession agreements should be complied in totality. The concession agreements formed the basis of extended	certain incentives and assurances based on which the investment was made into the sector. The said promises need to be adhered. Section 13(1)(a)(vi) of the AERA Act
international bidding processes followed by major private	read with Article 10.2 and 10.3 of the

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ASSOCILABA Comments	
ASSOCHAM Comments	GHIAL Response
sector investment in airports. The terms under which the	Concession Agreement mandates
airports would be regulated were a central component of both bidding and investment decisions. The extent to which they	regulating the Regulated Charges as defined in the Concession Agreement.
are abided by therefore is a key indicator of whether similar	As such Authority is not mandated to
agreements entered into by the Government of India (GOI)	regulate any Other Charges in respect
could reasonably be Concession Agreement	of the facilities and services provided
Concession agreement is the prime agreement based on which	at the Airport.
all the business decision were made at the time of taking up	
the project. Any change in interpretation of the concession	This clarifies that Cargo, Ground
document post facto will send wrong signal to the investor	Handling and Fuel services should be
community and will be impediment in growth in the aviation	kept outside the regulation.
sector. Concession agreements should be complied in totality.	
The concession agreements formed the basis of extended	The rationale of the same is as under:
international bidding processes followed by major private	
sector investment in airports. The terms under which the	Section 13(1)(a)(vi) of the AERA Act
airports would be regulated were a central component of both	read with Article 10.2 and 10.3 of the
bidding and investment decisions. The extent to which they	Concession Agreement mandates
are abided by therefore is a key indicator of whether similar	regulating the Regulated Charges as
agreements entered into by the Government of India (GOI)	defined in the Concession Agreement.
could reasonably be expected to be followed. In other words it will form the basis of investors' assessment of Indian sovereign	Section 13 of the AERA Act states as
risk.	
The provisions of the concession agreements could not be	under:
worsened without significant collateral damage. Such damage	"13. Functions of authority- (1) The
would include:	Authority shall perform the following
a.Triggering a demand on the Government for a compensation	functions in respect of major airports,
and or renegotiation of the concession terms	namely:-
b. Creating doubts in the minds of Indian and international	(a) to determine the tariff for the
equity	aeronautical services taking into
investors and debt providers over the sovereign risks	consideration-
associated	(i) the capital expenditure incurred
with future private public partnerships leading to reluctance to	and timely investment in improvement
invest and/or higher costs.	of airport facilities;
Indian airports have done India proud. They are rated amongst	(ii) the service provided, its quality
the best airports in world. Passenger for the first time has seen	and other relevant factors;
world class infrastructure. Regulatory decisions will go a long	
way in deciding on the way this journey will continue in future. The concession agreement was signed much prior to existence	(iii) the cost for improving efficiency;
of the AERA Act hence the Authority should adhere to the	(iv) economic and viable operation
concession agreement as it was the basic agreement on basis	of major airports; (v) revenue received
of which investment was made. After enactment of the act the	from services other than aeronautical
basic premise contained in concession cannot be taken away.	services
	(v) revenue received from services
	other than the aeronautical services;

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ASSOCHAM Comments	GHIAL Response
	(vi) the concession offered by the
	Central Government in any agreement
	or memorandum of understanding or
	otherwise;
	(vii) any other factor which may be
	relevant for the purposes of this Act:
	Provided that different tariff
	structures may be determined for
	different airports having regard to all
	or any of the above considerations
	specified at sub-clauses (i) to (vii)"
	(emphasis added)
	(
	A perusal of Section 13 of the AERA
	Act makes it clear that while
	determining tariff for aeronautical
	services, AERA is statutorily obligated
	to consider the concession offered to
	the Airport Operators by the Central
	Government and the other
	agreements which form an integral
	and inalienable part of such
	concession.
	Reading of Section 13(1)(a)(vi)
	indicates that the concession granted
	by the Central Government has to be
	read into the AERA Act and all its
	provisions as well as limitations
	contained therein have to be
	considered by AERA while determining
	tariff including while deciding which
	services in a particular case and in
	terms of the relevant Concession, can
	be regulated by AERA.
	This is from a confirment to some the
	This is further confirmed by a reading
	of the proviso to Section 13(1)(a) of

ASSOCHAM Comments	GHIAL Response
	the AERA Act which states that
	"different tariff structures may be
r	determined for different airports
	having regard to all or any of the
	considerations specified at sub-clauses
	(i) to(vii)" in the said section. In other
	words, the AERA Act recognizes that a
	straightjacket applicability of its
	provisions to all major airports is not
	intended and grants flexibility to AERA
	to determine tariff structures to
	different airports having regard to
	various considerations including the
	concession granted by the Central
	Government.
	Thus, even though the AERA Act
	empowers AERA to regulate tariff for
	Aeronautical Service as defined in
	Section 2(a) of the AERA Act, in case
	any concession has already been
	granted by the Central Government,
	AERA is statutorily mandated to
	consider such concession.
	In the case of RGIA, since one of the
	concession granted by the Central
	Government is that save for the
	'Regulated Charges', the GHIAL shall
	be free without any restriction to
	determine all Other Charges. Thus, on
	a reading of Section 13(1)(a)(vi) of the
	AERA Act read with Article 10.2 and
	10.3 of the Concession Agreement,
	AERA is only empowered to regulate
	the Regulated Charges as defined in
	the Concession Agreement (as an
	exception to the mandate of the Act

ASSOCHAM Comments	GHIAL Response
	which is recognized and allowed by
	the Act itself) and cannot regulate any
	Other Charges in respect of the
	facilities and services provided at the
	Airport including the other
	Aeronautical Services as defined in
	Section 2(a) of the AERA Act.
	As such Authority is not mandated to regulate any Other Charges in respect of the facilities and services provided at the Airport.
	This clarifies that Cargo, Ground Handling and Fuel services should be kept outside the regulation.
	GoAP: GoAP also has clarified that Cargo, Ground Handling and Fuel should not be regulated. GHIAL has accordingly classified Cargo assets as non-aero and revenue from Cargo, Ground Handling and Fuel services has been classified as non-aero. In our view this is what is contemplated under the Concession Agreement and the same is requested to be accepted by the Authority.
	The Authority should abide by the Concession Agreement otherwise this will send negative signals to the investor community.

	APAO Comments	GHIAL Response
4.1	APAO submits that it is important that AERA reconsiders its approach of imposition of Single Till, since India could become something of an	We appreciate the views of APAO.
	international outlier, with detrimental effects on its ability to attract	The concession agreements of GHIAL clearly mandates an
	major investment. It is clear that ICAO policies encompass the possibility	implied dual Till and the same needs to be adopted for GHIAL.
	of Dual Till and that one of the grounds that AERA has previously	
	adduced for Single Till does not therefore stand. In these circumstances,	
	AERA needs to reconsider whether Single Till is the most appropriate	
	system for regulation of RGIA. As identified above, Single Till is neither	
	the system most commonly applied to major private international	
	airports, nor that which is most likely to generate the investment that	
	the Indian aviation sector requires.	
4.2	It is evident from Articles 10.2 and 10.3 that the Concession Agreement	A conjoint reading Concession Agreement, State Support
	has clearly defined as to which charges would be regulated and which	Agreement and the Land lease Agreement indicates that the
	charges would be free from regulation.	following concessions and assurances have been granted to
	The Authority's view conflicts with the Concession Agreement which	the GHIAL at the time of the grant of the right/concession to
	clearly bifurcates the regulated and other charges. Bringing the other	develop the Airport, namely:
	charges under the ambit of regulation by imposing the Single Till	
	approach goes against the letter and spirit of the Concession Agreement.	The Concession Agreement defines and differentiates
	As per APAO's understanding, the GoAP has written a letter to the	between mandatory 'Airport Activities" consisting of
	Authority wherein it has clarified that Article 10(3) of the Concession	aeronautical as well as non-aeronautical activities at the
	Agreement gives the right to HIAL to set tariffs for non-airport facilities	Airport and non-mandatory 'Non-Airport Activities' which the
	and services and that the concession does not envisage cross subsidy	GHIAL is entitled to undertake at the Land (as defined under
	from non-aeronautical revenues to defray aeronautical charges.	the Land Lease Agreement).
		Thus, in addition to the rights granted to the GHIAL for setting
		up and operating the RGIA, certain additional rights have been
		granted for the purpose of development of the additional land
		In this regard, the Concession Agreement also makes a
		distinction between "Airport Activities" and Non-Airport
		Activities". While Airport Activities has been defined under

APAO Comments	GHIAL Response
	 Article 1.1 of the Concession Agreement to mean "the provision, at or in relation to the Airport, of the activities set out at Schedule 3, Part 1 as amended from time to time, pursuant to ICAO guidelines, provided that any activities that are not materially similar to those contemplated in Schedule 3, Part 1 shall require the mutual agreement of the Parties", Non-Airport Activities means "the provision, at or in relation to the Airport, of the services set out at Schedule 3, Part 2". Schedule 3, Part 2 of the Concession Agreement provides for the Non-Airport activities which consist of real estate activities.
	In view of the above, it is pertinent to note that the land earmarked for development of Non-Airport Activities as well as the cost of setting up and carrying out the Non-Airport Activities is not to be considered for the purpose of arriving at 'total project costs' of the Airport. GHIAL is permitted to utilize the said land parcel out of the total Land for carrying out Non-Airport Activities totally unconnected with the Airport business.

	APAO Comments	GHIAL Response
4.3	The ICAO policy does not specifically endorse Single Till regulation and leaves the choice of till to the mem bel' states based on their local conditions and circumstances. It also states that costs may be offset by	The Authority's earlier adoption of Single Till was based on the inference of ICAO principles supporting a Single Till.
	revenues depending upon the form of economic oversight adopted. It is APAO's view that it would be essential for the Authority to ensure that the till approach sought to made applicable to RGIA is also in line with the Concession Agreement which does not seek to regulate the 'Other Charges' nor does it contemplate any cross subsidization either from non-airport revenues or from Other Charges as envisaged in concession. In light of this, APAO humbly submits that the Authority's proposition Lo undertake such cross subsidization is not acceptable.	Since the above no more hold true it is earnestly requested that Authority does a rethink on the adoption of Single Till
4.4	Under Section 13 of the AERA Act, the Authority is statutorily required to consider the concession offered to the airport operators by the Central Government, as well as the other agreements which form an integral and inalienable part ofsuch concession. Section 13(1)(a)(vi) of the Act requires the Authority to consider the concession granted by the Central Government while determining the tariffs. The proviso to Section 13(1)(a) of the Act states that	It's earnestly requested that Cargo, ground handling and Fuel should not be regulated by Authority. The rationale of the same is as under: Section 13(1)(a)(vi) of the AERA Act read with Article 10.2 and 10.3 of the Concession Agreement mandates regulating the Regulated Charges as defined in the Concession Agreement.
	"differenttariffstructures may bedetermined for different airports having regard to all or any ojthe considerations specified at sub-clauses (i) to(vii) ". In other words, the Act recognizes the flexibility given to AERA to determine tariff structures for different airports having regard to various considerations including the concession granted by the Central Government. So even though the AERA Act empowers AERA to regulate tariff for Aeronautical Services as defined in Section 2(a) of the AERA Act, in case any concession has already been granted by the Central Government, AERA is required to consider the term s of such con cession. This is an exception to the mandate of the Act which is recognized and allowed by	Section 13 of the AERA Act states as under: "13. Functions of authority- (1) The Authority shall perform the following functions in respect of major airports, namely:- (a) to determine the tariff for the aeronautical services taking into consideration- (i) the capital expenditure incurred and timely investment in improvement of airport facilities; (ii) the service provided, its quality and other relevant

	APAO Comments	GHIAL Response
4.5	APAO Comments the Act itself. In the case of RGIA, the concession granted by the Central Government states that apart from the 'Regulated Charges', the Airport shall be free without any restriction to determine all Other Charges. This implies that AERA is only empowered to regulate the Regulated Charges as defined in the Concession Agreement. The Authority's contention that, as per the Act, it is required to taken into consideration agreements only with the Central Government is contrary to the MoCA's approach which does take into account the provisions of all associated agreements. The Authority also considered all associated agreements in the course of the tariff fixation of Delhi and Mumbai airports. APAO is of the view that all agreements associated with the concession should be taken into consideration by the Authority for RGIA too. The Authority has considered the Interest Free Loan, the Grant, the land given for the airport usage etc. in the State Support Agreement in determining the tariffs for RGIA. It therefore also needs to take into consideration the other critical aspect stated in this agreement, namely, the equity internal rate of return. APAO understands that the equity internal rate of return of 18.33% mentioned in the State Support Agreement is based on the business plan and the financial and feasibility projections in respect of the airports viability submitted to the State Government with the concurrence of the MoCA. The Authority should	GHIAL Responsefactors;(iii) the cost for improving efficiency;(iv) economic and viable operation of major airports; (v)revenue received from services other than aeronauticalservices(v) revenue received from services other than theaeronautical services;(vi) the concession offered by the Central Government in anyagreement or memorandum of understanding or otherwise;(vii) any other factor which may be relevant for the purposesof this Act:Provided that different tariff structures may be determinedfor different airports having regard to all or any of the aboveconsiderations specified at sub-clauses (i) to (vii)"(emphasis added)A perusal of Section 13 of the AERA Act makes it clear thatwhile determining tariff for aeronautical services, AERA isstatutorily obligated to consider the concession offered to theAirport Operators by the Central Government and the other
	Agreement is based on the business plan and the financial and feasibility projections in respect of the airports viability submitted to the State	statutorily obligated to consider the concession offered to the
		AERA Act and all its provisions as well as limitations contained

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APAO Comments	GHIAL Response
	therein have to be considered by AERA while determining tariff including while deciding which services in a particular case and in terms of the relevant Concession, can be regulated by AERA.
	This is further confirmed by a reading of the proviso to Section 13(1)(a) of the AERA Act which states that "different tariff structures may be determined for different airports having regard to all or any of the considerations specified at sub-clauses (i) to(vii)" in the said section. In other words, the AERA Act recognizes that a straightjacket applicability of its provisions to all major airports is not intended and grants flexibility to AERA to determine tariff structures to different airports having regard to various considerations including the
	concession granted by the Central Government. Thus, even though the AERA Act empowers AERA to regulate tariff for Aeronautical Service as defined in Section 2(a) of the AERA Act, in case any concession has already been granted by the Central Government, AERA is statutorily mandated to consider such concession.
	In the case of RGIA, since one of the concession granted by the Central Government is that save for the 'Regulated Charges', the GHIAL shall be free without any restriction to determine all Other Charges. Thus, on a reading of Section

1	APAO Comments	GHIAL Response
		13(1)(a)(vi) of the AERA Act read with Article 10.2 and 10.3 of the Concession Agreement, AERA is only empowered to regulate the Regulated Charges as defined in the Concession Agreement (as an exception to the mandate of the Act which is recognized and allowed by the Act itself) and cannot regulate any Other Charges in respect of the facilities and services provided at the Airport including the other Aeronautical Services as defined in Section 2(a) of the AERA Act.
		As such Authority is not mandated to regulate any Other Charges in respect of the facilities and services provided at the Airport. This clarifies that Cargo, Ground Handling and Fuel services should be kept outside the regulation.
		GoAP: GoAP also has clarified that Cargo, Ground Handling and Fuel should not be regulated. GHIAL has accordingly classified Cargo assets as non-aero and revenue from Cargo, Ground Handling and Fuel services has been classified as non-aero. In our view this is what is contemplated under the Concession Agreement and the same is requested to be accepted by the Authority.
4.6	It is understood that the Planning Commission has written a letter dated October 6, 2010 to the Authority in which it has stated that the choice of economic regulation is an important factor in attracting private sector	Even the Planning Commission is not in favor of Single Till. We request the Authority to reconsider its stand taken for regulatory till.

APAO Comments	GHIAL Response
investment. It has also opposed the Single Till approach.	
The private sector would only be willing to invest in the airport sector	
provided it is incentivized in a manner which is attractive and at the	
same time affords the user, better air connectivity at an affordable price.	
In the 12th Five Year Plan (2012-2017), the Planning Commission has	
projected an investment of Rs.710 billion for the development of airport	
infrastructure in the country. Of this, Rs.570 billion is expected to be	
invested by the private sector. It is therefore imperative that the	
regulatory framework is investor friendly. A case in point is that though	
as per the Government's liberalized policy, 100% Foreign Direct	
Investment (FDI) is allowed for the development of Greenfield airports,	
the airport sector hasn't managed to attract FDI. This situation	
underscores the need for a predictable and conducive regulatory	
environment which creates confidence in, and attracts, investors.	
It is particularly important to note this in light of the Prime Minister and	
Planning Commission Chairman both announcing over Rs. 20,000 Crore	
investment in airports through PPP mechanisms in June 2013.	
In addition, given the 'lumpy' nature of Airport CapEx and investment, it is	
unusual that the Authority has taken the opaque view in the	
Consultation Paper as stated in 4.6.1.1 that the meaning implied is thai	
the target amount of money is 'invested as equity'. Globally, airport	
infrastructure investment has been historically based on funding through	
debt and equity and the policies followed by Indian operators including	
HIAL, is no different. There is little to no chance that investors will fund	
airport investments through a majority equity infusion given typical size	
of investments, especially of the quantum required in India and	
particularly on greenfield airport projects. This to us seems a wholly	
unreasonable and unrealistic assumpti on by the Authority and one that	
we believe should be reconsidered.	

APAO Comments	GHIAL Response
Similar to the CC's observation in 4.7.(.1 above, the circumstances in respect of RGIA would be completely different from the three London airports. The setting up of RGIA in particular was unique because it was the first Greenfield airport which was developed using the PPP model. Accordingly, it may not be appropriate to compare the facts and circumstances in respect of India, which belongs to an emerging market, to those of the UK which is in a mature market, in deciding the applicable regulatory approach. For example, the requirements of India for investment are likely to be greater and the risks for investors greater - both factors which should influence the choice of till. It is also notable, as identified above, that the regulatory arrangements in the UK are under review in ways which may place less emphasis on cost based regulation.	We appreciate APAO for highlighting the fact that setting up of GHIAL was unique because it was the first Greenfield airport developed under PPP model.
APAO is strongly of the view that the Dual Till approach, which has found acceptance and application globally amongst regulators, be made applicable to HIAL.	We appreciate the view of APAO
Recital E of both the Land Lease Agreement and the State Support Agreement clearly outline the fact that the project would be feasible only with provision of State Support in the form of resources (finance, land etc.) to build, own and operate the Airport which includes non- aeronautical activities as stated in 4.9.1.2 and 4.9.1.3 above. The recommendation of the Authority in the Consultation Paper would go against the spirit of the State Support Agreement and the Land Lease	On a conjoint reading of Section 13(1)(a)(vi) of the AERA Act read with Article 10.2 and 10.3 of the Concession Agreement mandates regulating the Regulated Charges as defined in the Concession Agreement and not regulate any Other Charges in respect of the facilities and services provided at the Airport not using the revenue therefrom to subsidize the Aero Charges.

	APAO Comments	GHIAL Response
	Agreement which lay down that the very purpose of providing the	
	various resources including land was to make the project feasible. The	The value of the land earmarked for Non-Airport Activities
	Authority seems to have taken a narrow view of the term 'project' to	(market or notional) cannot be included in nor deducted from
	mean only the airport as opposed to the definition in the Land Lease	the RAB and accordingly the revenue generated therefrom
	agreement which defines the project to include aeronautical and	cannot be taken into account for cross subsidizing
	nonaeronautical	aeronautical tariff at airport.
1	activities as stated in 4.9.1.1 above. Further, it also seems to have	
	considered that financial support in the form of Advance Development	
	Fund Grant (ADFG) and the Interest Free Loan (IFL) combined with use of	
	land only for aeronautical activities would end up making the project	
	feasible. It therefore does not take into consideration the fact that the	
	use of land for non-aeronautical activities was integral to the case for	
	developing the airport and making it financially feasible. We understand	
	that the GoAP has written a letter to the Authority clarifying that the	
	land was given for the socio-economic benefit of the state and that	
	subtracting its market value from the RAB will mean that the desired	
	benefit will not be achieved.	
	The development of a Greenfield airport is a risky undertaking. It involves	
	the construction of significant infrastructure before even a single plane	
	can fly. There are therefore very high fixed lip front costs which are very	
	difficult for an investor to justify. The provision of land for commercial	
	exploitation for the period of the concession was therefore intended to	
	provide the investor with additional sources of revenue to enable returns	
	on the airport project to be sufficient to remunerate the capital	
	employed . Nevertheless, the Operator also has to bear the risks	
	associated with the various businesses forming a part of the	
	nonaeronautical	
	activities. And the land provided for commercial exploitation is not for	
	perpetuity, but for the life of the concession only. The proposed	
	deduction of the market value of such land from the RAB runs counter to	

	APAO Comments	GHIAL Response
	the whole purpose for which it was provided. It would mean that it is	
	effectively being used to reduce aeronautical revenues rather than to	
	augment the returns to the Operator from the investment made in the	
	project. By significantly reducing the overall returns to the project, this	
	would reduce returns of the developer/operator and negatively impact	
1 1	its financial viability and in a way that does so retrospectively contrary to	
	natural justice and the principles of good regulation.	
J J	In view of the above discussion, it is APAO's view that assigning a value	
	to the land and subtracting the same from the RAB is not consistent with	
	the Concession Agreement.	
	The treatment proposed by the Authority also gives rise to a question	
	whether by way of a corollary, the market value of land used for the	
	airport business should be added to the RAB for tariff determination.	
	It is also worth noting that the proposed treatment of non-aeronautical	
	land is neither consistent with the theory of single till, nor with	
	international precedents. First, in so far as there is an economic rationale	
	for single till, it is that all the revenues attributable to airport-related	
	activities should be taken into account. There is no good reason why this	
1 1	should encompass land and activities outside the airport boundary which	
	do not arise directly from operation of the airport.	
	Second, to the extent that values and/or revenues are moved into and	
	out of the RAB, account needs to be taken of the total ity of the financial	
	flows involved. In this case, that would mean the costs of developing any	
	land, not just the revenues or market value.	
}	Based on a review of the practices at several global airports, it is apparent	
	that real estate is kept outside the regulatory till and not used to cross	
	subsidize airport charges. This practice is followed at the Belgium	
	(Bruxelles), France (Charles de Gaulle, Orly), Germany (Frankfurt,	
	Hamburg),' Italy (Rome, Milan and Venice), Australia (Adelaide, Brisbane,	
	Melbourne, Perth and Sydney) and New Zealand (Auckland, Christchurch	

APAO Comments	GHIAL Response
and Wellington) airports. In short, AERA's proposal is in principle inconsistent with the agreements on which the airport's development was based and investment attracted (representing a substantial retrospective adjustment to those terms) and is in practice inconsistent with regulatory best practice. Non-airport related activities should not feature in the single till and to the extent adjustments to the till are made, they need to take account of all the financial flows involved.	

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APAO Comments	GHIAL Response	
In determining the CoE, the Authority needs to pay regard to the	The minimum equity IRR of 18.33% promised under the GO	
outcome it wishes to incentivize, in particular, the availability of	No.130 dated July 26, 2013 issued by GoAP and the State	
investment in a fast growing aviation sector. The losses to consumers	Support Agreement is integral to the concession itself being a	
from delay in capacity being brought on stream due to lack of	fundamental premise of the said concession and cannot be	
investment, and resulting higher fares charged by airlines, are likely to	read in isolation or disregarded/varied once the Parties to the	
outweigh shorter term benefits from keeping the cost of equity too low.	concession have recognized, accepted and acted on the same.	
Against this background, it is crucial that the CaE provides an assurance	In view of the above, the Authority is requested not to alter or	
to current -and prospective investors that returns on their investment	vary the assurance of minimum 18.33% Equity IRR granted to	
are commensurate with the risks they have borne. The absence or	GHIAL.	
adequate returns risks disincentivizing investment as investors pursue		
more remunerative opportunities both in India and more widely. The	Also the following are results of some of the studies carried	
importance of this dimension is underlined by the potential for (and lack	out by various experts on cost of equity. These are very	
of success so far in attracting) FDI to Indian airports. The regulator 's	established organizations of national and international repute.	
judgment needs to take full account of this need to attract investment	These studies were carried out on behalf of the Airports, the	
into the sector. This is not so much an issue of balancing investor	industry associations as well as MoCA, GOI. However the	
interests against those of passengers but more of balancing the short	report of NIPFP relied by Authority have no such experience.	
term interests of passengers in low prices against their longer term	The resultant number of NIPFP is nowhere near the estimates	
interests in enhanced capacity and connectivity in a situation where high	of these reports.	
rates of grow thme ans that the longerterm is actually not that far into the future.		
It is also submitted that as against the returns to equity investors in the	Cost of Equity	
power sector which are allowed on the equity infused, in the airports	Jacobs 24%	
sector such return is allowed on the RAB. Since the RAB depreciates over	KPMG (for APAO) 20%-25%	
the concession period, this means that the effective returns are lower for	based on debt equity ratio.	
the operator. The CoE allowed by the regulator therefore needs to	SBI Caps (For MoCA/AAI) 18.5% to 20.5% SDIGHT (5.10) 18.5% to 20.5%	
compensate the operator to make up for the lower returns by allowing a	CRISIL (For MIAL) 18.16% to 20.44%	
suitably higher CoE.	based on debt equity ratio.	
	NIPFP 13.2%	
	We therefore request the Authority to reconsider Cost of	
	Equity	

Rajiv Gandhi International Airport, Shamshabad, Hyderabad Response to Comments of Association of Private Airport Operators (APAO)

	APAO Comments	GHIAL Response
	In view of the discussions, APAO wishes to submit that the beta estimate relied upon by the Authority is flawed and that the beta of 0.75 originally	Same concern is raised by other airport operators. We request the Authority to reconsider the same.
	proposed by HTAL be considered in determining its CoE.	
	APAO submits that the report relied upon by NIPFP should be	GHIAL and various other private operators have raised their
	reconsidered due to the following factors:	concerns regarding the Cost of Equity report prepared by
	• The analyst seems to have estimated a probable regulatory outcome to	NIPFP. We appreciate the concern raised by APAO and
	determine the market value leading to circularity in the approach adopted	request the Authority to reconsider Cost of Equity.
	• Estimates of market value of equity by analysts can have a wide range,	
	and are unlikely to serve as a reliable basis for tariff estimation.	
	APAO submits that the Authority should allow the foreign exchange	The Authority should not penalize GHIAL by not allowing
	variations as a pass through cost in its determination of tariff for	foreign fluctuations. Cost of debt has reduced considerably
	aeronautical services on account" of the following reasons:	because of ECB.
	 HIAL chose to borrow funds by way of ECB due to the cheaper 	
	borrowing cost. It has passed on the entire benefit arising on such saving	The sourcing of funds at a lower rate in foreign exchange is for
	to the end user and as such the associated risk also needs to be passed	the benefit to the passenger / other stakeholders by way of a
	on to the end user. If I-HAL had chosen to borrow by way of a domestic	lower WACC.
	loan, there would have been an additional cash outflow of approximately	
	Rs.211 million per annum 011 account of interest costs [arrived at by	However this means of funding also carries the inherent risk
	considering a differential interest rate of 4.17% [11.85% on Rupee Loan -	of foreign exchange fluctuations. Taking the benefit of a lower
	7.68% on ECB Loan] on a borrowing of Rs.5.07 billion.	interest rate but not allowing the resultant Forex fluctuation
	The foreign exchange loss is not notional, but an actualloss The barrow finalized prime of AFRAbarrow stillers	goes against the principles of natural justice.
L 6	• The borrowing was finalized prior to AERA's proposition of disallowing	The fluctuation used to be incomposited as part of DAD
	the forex loss adjustment in the Consultation Paper. Hence, there is no	The fluctuation need to be incorporated as part of RAB
	way that this borrowing can be reversed by Airport Operator .	because of following reasons:
	 The foreign exchange loss would adversely impact HIAL's profitability, 	(1) The level of Forex borrowing is not excessive. The level of
		borrowing is at level generally accepted to be normal in the industry.
		(2) This borrowing was availed before the Authority's current
		stand was finalized. The borrowing structure cannot be
L		stand was manzed. The borrowing structure callior be

APAO Comments	GHIAL Response
	amended now.
	The Authority should appreciate the fact that the Company has not retained the benefits of cheaper borrowing cost and is passed on to the passenger in the form of lower WACC.
	If the Company had taken Domestic Loan instead of the ECB equivalent amount, the outflows of cash towards interest costs would have been much more. Also, it should be noted that the loss of Forex fluctuation on interest payments & principal repayments is real in nature and not a notional loss.
	GHIAL has taken the hit of the Forex fluctuations in actuals of FY 2011-12 and FY 2012-13 owing to interest and repayments servicing the ECB loan to the extent of Rs 34.46 Crs. This loss is not included in the computations of WACC.
	Therefore, Authority is requested to allow the Loss on impact of Forex Fluctuations by Inclusion of same in RAB.
	We request the Authority either to allow Forex fluctuation or treat ECB as if it were RTL.
APAO wishes to submit that Clause 9.2 of the Concession Agreement in respect of ' Monitoring of Performance Standards' lays down the performance standards and penalties for not conforming to the standards. We believe these provisions are stringent and provide an adequate deterrent in case of the operator's non-compliance. Therefore,	In terms of the AERA Act it is earnestly submitted that the role and jurisdiction of the Authority is limited to monitoring compliance of the service quality standards prescribed under the concession agreement. The prescription of any new services standards is not envisaged.
the imposition of additional penalties by the Authority would result ill doubling the jeopardy for the operator. APAO therefore requests the Authority to reconsider its decision of imposing a rebate mechanism as it	While Section 13(1)(a)(ii) of the AERA Act permits the Authority to consider the services provided, its quality and

APAO Com	ments	GHIAL Response
would impo	se additional onerous penalties on the operator for the same	other relevant factors in determining the tariff, there is no
default.		explicit power vested with the Authority to prescribe any
The operati	ons of any airport involve participation of various external	penalties under the AERA Act in the event of a failure to meet
agencies fo	r air traffic control, security etc. Hence, the efficient	service quality requirements.
functioning	of an airport is also dependent upon such agencies. These	In view of the Authority being required to take the terms of
agencies ar	e independent and not under the control and supervision of	the concession agreement into consideration for determining
the airport	operator. Therefore, it may be inappropriate to penalize the	tariff and in view of the concession agreement already
airport ope	rator alone for service quality discrepancies as some of such	providing for a mechanism for penalties for failure to achieve
discrepanci	es may have occurred due to factors which are completely	service quality requirements, the Authority should not only
beyond the	operator's control.	take into consideration the service quality requirements, but
Several priv	ate airports in India have been adjudged as the best airports	also the penalties for failure to meet service quality
in the work	in their respective categories. It may therefore be	requirements as set forth therein. Any penalties prescribed by
appropriate	e for the Authority to consider a mechanism which recognizes	the Authority for failure to meet the said service quality
awards and	incentivizes superlative performance by airports.	requirements would effectively tantamount to the Authority
		not taking into consideration the terms (including penalties)
		of the Concession Agreements and therefore would not be
		consistent with the AERA Act
		Therefore, Authority is requested not to impose additional
		standards and penalties over and above those enumerated in
		the CA. Additional quality parameters, maintaining these
		standards, and monitoring requires additional capital and
		operating expenditure. The same needs to be allowed over
1		and above the amounts allowed by Authority. As such the
		Authority is requested to continue with the methodology as
		prescribed under Concession Agreements for compliance,
		monitoring and penalties for non-conformity.

S. No.	Blue Dart Comments	GHI	AL Response	
proposing to consider final User Development Fee (UDF) for domestic and international departing passengers and proposes to determine the other charges in the tariff card, namely Landing and Parking Charges, Common Infrastructure Charges, Fixed Electricity Ground Power Charges and	There has been no major and Housing charges (et 2009) since commencer Airport, Hyderabad. This does not even cover If we were to take the in as under	xcept for a 10% ment of operatio er inflation.	increase in on at RGI	
	Housing (LPH) charges were taken as per existing rates for the year 2010-11 and then 10% escalation was considered, year on year,	RATE OF INFLATION	CPI-IW %	Total
	starting from 2011-12.	2000	4.02	
1		2001	3.77	
		2002	4.31	
		2003	3.81	
		2004	3.77	
		2005	4.25	
		2006	6.16	
		2007	6.38	
		2008	8.32	
		2009	10.83	
		2010	12.11	
		2011	8.87	
		2012	9.30	
		2013	11.04	96.94

S. No.	Blue Dart Comments	GHIAL Response
2	The said Consultation Paper broadly discussed only about charges in UDF charges and other aeronautical charges have remained constant. The Consultation Paper is silent on the basis of which 10% increase on LPH have been arrived and basis on which other aeronautical charges will be decided in the 1st Regulatory Period. The projected increase of 10% year over year seems arbitrary in nature and very high and is not in line with the current inflation rate. Inflation should be linked to WPI Index and must have a scientifically tested formula. Further increasing the already high charges will further cripple the financial health of the airlines operating at HIAL As all the Airlines will be directly impacted due to any increase in aeronautical charges, we request HIAL to provide the basis on which the increase in aeronautical charges have been arrived and further request AERA to validate the increase on comparison with similar airports around the globe. With the increase in volume , the cost actually should start going down. We do not see the benefits of economies of scale being built in the entire consultation paper	This is the first time any increase is proposed in LPH charges at RGI Airport. (Except for 10% increase in 2009). There is a misconceived 10% increase being discussed. There is no 10% increase proposed by us. WPI increase considered in the Consultation Paper is 6.5%.
3	As AERA rightly pointed out in the Consultation Paper, as long as fair rate of return is given to Airport Operator, he should be indifferent to regulatory till. Hence as an Airport user, we recommend AERA to determine the aeronautical tariffs under single till to avoid substantial increase in the aeronautical charges. Any increase in aeronautical charges will substantially affect the bottom line of already beleaguered airline companies operating out of HIAL.	A conjoint reading of the following documents i.e. Concession Agreement, State Support Agreement and The Land lease Agreement indicates that the following concessions and assurances (relevant for the present queries) have been granted at the time of the grant of the right/concession to develop the Airport, namely: (i) Under Clause 10.2 read with Schedule 6 of the Concession Agreement, only Airport Charges defined as the 'Regulated Charges' are to be regulated by the IRA (i.e. AERA). (ii) Under Clause 10.2.4 of the Concession Agreement, the Regulated Charges shall be approved in consonance with ICAO Policies until the earlier of (a) the date that outstanding Debt in respect of the Initial Phase has been repaid and (b) fifteen (15) years from the Airport Opening Date. (iii) In view of Clause 10.3 of the Concession

Rajiv Gandhi International Airport, Shamshabad, Hyderabad
Response to Comments of Blue Dart Aviation Limited.

S. No.	Blue Dart Comments	GHIAL Response
		Agreement, the GHIAL shall "be free without any restriction" to determine all Other Charges which are levied in respect of all other facilities and services at the Airport. (iv) The Concession Agreement defines and differentiates between mandatory 'Airport Activities" consisting of aeronautical as well as non-aeronautical activities at the Airport and non-mandatory 'Non- Airport Activities' which GHAIL is entitled to undertake at the Land (as defined under the Land Lease Agreement).
		The Concession Agreement (in terms of Article 10.2 and 10.3) has classified only two types of charges at RGIA i.e. Regulated Charges and Other Charges for the Airport Activities carried out at the Airport by the GHIAL consisting of both aeronautical as well as non- aeronautical activities. The Concession Agreement also defines "Regulated Charges" under Article 10.2.1 to mean only such Airport Charges as specified in Schedule 6 of the Concession Agreement and thus in terms of Schedule 6, Regulated Charges means the following charges i.e. (i) Landing Housing and Parking charges, (ii) Passenger Service Fee and (iii) User Development Fee.
		While Article 10.2 read with Schedule 6 of the Concession Agreement mandates that the IRA i.e. AERA (pursuant to being empowered for the purpose) shall approve/determine the Regulated Charges, Article 10.3 states unequivocally that except the Regulated Charges mentioned in Schedule 6, the GHIAL shall "be free without any restriction" to determine all Other Charges which are levied in respect of the activities defined as the Airport Activities at the Airport. Other Charges have been defined in Article 10.3 to include all facilities and services provided at the Airport except facilities and services in respect of which Regulated Charges are levied. In other words, the Concession Agreement provides that while AERA shall be empowered to regulate all Regulated Charges mentioned in Schedule 6.

S. No.	Blue Dart Comments	GHIAL Response
4	HIAL has proposed 24% as return of equity. AERA has appointed National Institute of Public Finance and Policy(NIPFP) to estimate the cost of equity. NIFPP has arrived at a cost of equity of 13.2% considering asset beta 0.4% and debt equity ratio of 1.17:1. However, AERA has considered asset beta 0.5% and debt equity ratio of 1.5:1 and arrived at 16% as cost of equity. As NIPFP has determined 13.2% to be the cost of equity	 HIAL has proposed 24% return on equity based on the report submitted by Jacobs, an international expert and the same is submitted to the Authority. The Authority has appointed NIPFP to determine cost of equity for private major airports in India. There are many lacunas in the report of NIPFP and the same have been pointed out at the time of consultation of Delhi and Mumbai airport. Also the mandated minimum return in the concession also needs to be considered as the minimum return
5	after detailed analysis, we request AERA to consider 13.2% as the final return on equity. The Regulatory Asset Base (RAB) has been arrived at without subtracting the fair market value of real estate development (outside the terminal building). The land outside the terminal building was given to HIAL to make the project viable, hence, we request AERA to reduce the fair market value of land from RAB. This will result in the reduction of Aeronautical charges to Airport User.	 which needs to be considered as the mininum return which needs to be allowed. The methodology being suggested has no legal standing. Neither the concession, nor the AERA act has laid down any such methodology of removal of value of land. This kind of treatment has never been seen in any regulatory tariff determination anywhere in world. A conjoint reading of Concession Agreement, State Support Agreement and the Land lease Agreement indicates that the following concessions and assurances have been granted to the GHIAL at the time of the grant of the right/concession to develop the Airport, namely: The Concession Agreement defines and differentiates between mandatory 'Airport activities" consisting of aeronautical as well as non-aeronautical activities at the Airport and non-mandatory 'Non-Airport Activities' which the GHIAL is entitled to undertake at the Land (as defined under the Land Lease Agreement). Thus, in addition to the rights granted to the GHIAL for setting up and operating the RGIA, certain additional rights have been granted for the purpose of development of the additional land for purely commercial purposes not relating to the airport activity. In this regard, as noticed hereinabove, the

S. No. Blue Dart Comments	GHIAL Response
	 Concession Agreement also makes a distinction between "Airport Activities" and Non-Airport Activities". While Airport Activities has been defined under Article 1.1 of the Concession Agreement to mean "the provision, at or in relation to the Airport, of the activities set out at Schedule 3, Part 1 as amended from time to time, pursuant to ICAO guidelines, provided that any activities that are not materially similar to those contemplated in Schedule 3, Part 1 shall require the mutual agreement of the Parties", Non-Airport Activities means "the provision, at or in relation to the Airport, of the services set out at Schedule 3, Part 2". Schedule 3, Part 2 of the Concession Agreement provides for the Non-Airport activities which consist of real estate activities. These activities are totally unconnected with the Airport Activities. In view of the above, it is pertinent to note that the land earmarked for development of Non-Airport Activities as well as the cost of setting up and carrying out the Non-Airport Activities vibre for the purpose of arriving at 'total project costs' of the Airport. GHIAL is permitted to utilize the said land parcel out of the total Land for carrying out Non-Airport Activities which are purely commercial, real estate and totally unconnected with the Airport business.
	Conclusion: On a conjoint reading of Section 13(1)(a)(vi) of the AERA Act read with Article 10.2 and 10.3 of the Concession Agreement mandates
	regulating the Regulated Charges as defined in the Concession Agreement and not regulate any Other Charges in respect of the facilities and services
	provided at the Airport nor using the revenue therefrom to subsidize the Aero Charges. The value of
CP 09/2013-14 (01.04.2011 - 31.03.2016)	the land earmarked for Non-Airport Activities (market

S. No.	Blue Dart Comments	GHIAL Response
		or notional) cannot be included in nor deducted from
		the RAB and accordingly the revenue generated
		therefrom cannot be taken into account for cross
		subsidizing aeronautical tariff at airport.

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Rajiv Gandhi International Airport, Shamshabad, Hyderabad Response to Comments of CII

S.No.	CII Comments	GHIAL Response
1	On a conjoint reading of Section 13(1)(a)(vi) of the AERA Act read with Article 10.2 and 10.3 of the Concession Agreement mandates regulating the	We appreciate that CII has highlighted an important aspect.
	Regulated Charges as defined in the Concession Agreement and not regulate any Other Charges in respect of the facilities and services provided at the Airport nor using the revenue therefrom to	Concession Agreement is the most sacrosanct because that is the basis on which the bidding was done by GHIAL.
	subsidize the Aero Charges. The value of the land earmarked for Non-Airport Activities (market or notional) cannot be included in nor deducted from the RAB and accordingly the revenue generated therefrom cannot be taken into account for cross subsidizing aeronautical tariff at	GHIAL had made investment based on the concession agreement and material shift in the conditions means that the investor is called in to invest based on certain promise and the same is not honored later.
	airport.	This can at best be termed as trapping of the investor.
	Any change in interpretation of the concession document post facto will send wrong signal to the investor community and will be impediment in growth in the aviation sector. Therefore, Concession Agreements should be complied in totality. This becomes even more pertinent as altering the	This is against the healthy growth of sector and this will result in a poor infrastructure and inefficient operations.
	provisions of Concession Agreement might cause the following: a) Triggering a demand on the Government for a compensation and or renegotiation of the concession terms (as witnessed in many Sectors of the economy)	
	b) Creating doubts in the minds of Indian and International equity investors and debt providers over the sovereign risks associated with future private public partnerships leading to reluctance to invest and/or higher costs	
2	One of the most critical aspects that would define success of any ambitious plan would be the Rate of Return on the Capital deployed by private players on their investments across different sectors, commensurate to the risk taken. Any indication that the returns to the investors in the future would	The minimum equity IRR of 18.33% (which is equivalent to approx. 24% return on Equity) promised under the GO No.130 dated July 26, 2013 issued by GoAP and the State Support Agreement is integral to the concession.
	be sub-optimal would be disastrous for the investment climate and consequently private participation in PPP. Therefore, Government needs to ensure a fair return, especially in sectors that are	This is a fundamental premise of the said concession. In view of the above, the Authority is earnestly requested to abide by minimum 18.33% Equity IRR
	regulated.	granted to GHIAL under concession.

Rajiv Gandhi International Airport, Shamshabad, Hyderabad Response to Comments of Cll

S.No.	CII Comments	GHIAL Response
	This becomes even more pertinent for Airports Sector as they are often perceived as riskier when compared to other Infrastructure Sectors like power, ports, roads, etc. Further, Aviation Sector is cyclical in nature and the degree of severity or volatility in cash flows is higher. We are of the view that the IRR on Equity should not be lowered below the percentage envisaged in the Concession Agreement.	
3	 Agreement. GHIAL (GMR Hyderabad International Airport Limited) has been leased approx, 5500 acres of land by Govt. of Andhra Pradesh. The lease deed permits GHIAL to undertake Airport and Non-Airport activities and GHIAL has to pay nominal annual lease rent as per the lease deed. Now AERA has taken a view that since land lease agreement has been signed with the State Government and not the Central Government, the Authority is not bound to consider them for tariff determination. As this goes against the very purpose of awarding the concession, we request the Authority to review its opinion. 	CII has very well pointed out the lacuna in the proposed treatment of land by the Authority. On a conjoint reading of Section 13(1)(a)(vi) of the AERA Act read with Article 10.2 and 10.3 of the Concession Agreement mandates regulating the Regulated Charges as defined in the Concession Agreement and not regulate any Other Charges in respect of the facilities and services provided at the Airport nor using the revenue therefrom to subsidize the Aero Charges. The value of the land earmarked for Non-Airport Activities (market or notional) cannot be included in nor deducted from the RAB and accordingly the revenue generated therefrom cannot be taken into account for cross subsidizing aeronautical tariff at

SI.No.	FIA COMMENTS	GHIAL RESPONSE
	Without prejudice to the above, it is respectfully submitted that even if the claim of HIAL with respect to the Pre-control period losses be treated as valid and admissible, the Authority must consider and decide:-	Introductory Para, no comments.
	What was the Return on Equity claimed by HIAL during the FY 2008-09 and 2009-10?	The cost of equity claimed by GHIAL is same for the entire control period including 2008-09 and 2009-10. GHIAL has filed for 24% cost of equity. However the cost of equity considered by Authority is 16%.
	What was the scheme of regulatory approval granted to HIAL for levy of aeronautical tariffs in the FYs 2008-09 and 2009-10?	AERA to respond
	What was the Business Model adopted by HIAL during the FY 2008-09 and 2009-10 which led to allegedly such huge losses?	The losses were for the period before AERA gave adhoc approval of tariff. Therefore the Capex and opex remained under remunerated leading to losses which need to be recouped.
	Whether any shortfall during the Pre-control period should not be borne by HIAL, especially in absence of any scrutiny by the Authority?	There is no logic in the statement as the Capex and Opex of GHIAL needs to be adequately remunerated. There cannot be any investment without the same being remunerated. Also the entire control period including the earlier control period has been under the scrutiny of Authority. The interim tariff also was approved after proper user
1	Inclusion of Pre-control Period Losses in current	consultation in 2010. The logic of inclusion of past losses (entitlement) is that
	control period for the purpose of determining target revenue is fallacious	any Capex and Opex spent by airport operator need to be remunerated in full.
	What is the legal basis for inclusion of such Pre- control period losses?	The Authority can include the historical shortfall of entitlement for fixing the charges of the current control period. There is fair and logical approach to take to ensure the airport gets due returns.
		The earlier losses are the shortfall of earlier tariff determination (vide order number 06/2010-11 dated

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		26th October 2010) after AERA came into existence.
		These are not pre-control losses.
	When the regulatory period is being computed	The earlier shortfall of the period prior to 1 st April 2011 was mandated by AERA to be reviewed during the
	from 01.04.2011 to 31.03.2016, how does the question arise of inclusion of losses prior to such	current determination. GHIAL's tariff was first approved
	control period?	vide order number 06/2010-11 dated 26th October 2010.
	Under what circumstances, whether	
	legally/economically/financially, can the present	
	consumers (including passengers or airlines) be	GHIAL was granted inadequate interim UDF which has
	burdened with the past burden of the utility?	resulted in losses at airport. There has been a severe
		downturn in economy resulting in dip in air traffic since
		start of airport operations.
l.		However, despite incurring these losses, GHIAL did not
1		compromise on meeting its performance standards and
		enhancing infrastructure to the benefit of airlines and
		passengers. In order to enable GHIAL to continue to
		maintain globally benchmarked performance standards
		enhancement of UDF is critical.
		Since financial and operational viability of the airport
		needs to be ensured which is an enshrined objective of
		AERA under its guiding legislation, he requested to
		consider the request made by GHIAL.
		The earlier determination had laid down that the
		determination will be reviewed at the time of final
		determination. The earlier order laid down as under:
r T		determination. The carrier order faid down as under.
		"After reconciliation the UDF rate has been
		worked out as Rs-430/-per domestic passenger
		and Rs.1700/-per international passenger, exclusive of service tax, on an ad-hoc basis w.e.f,
		01.11.2010 (details at Annexure III). Authority is
		conscious that on a detailed assessment,
		including bottoms up analysis of all revenues and
		expenditures, the UDF rotes presently determined
		may need to be altered. This exercise will be
		undertaken ot the final determination stage."

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		As such the inclusion is justified.
	Has the Authority verified the losses as claimed by HIAL?	Entire data has been under scrutiny of the Authority. This earlier adhoc determination also was scrutinized and based on the determination of Authority. The earlier period also went through consultation vide consultation paper number 07/2010-11 dated 23 rd September 2010. As such Authority has scrutinized the past losses.
	Is there any legal basis for allowing the carrying cost (Rs.73 Crores) over and above the Pre-control Period losses to the detriment of passengers/consumers?	Money has a time value and this needs to be taken into consideration. A rupee paid now or after 10 years has inherent
	A perusal of the Consultation Paper No. 07/2010- 11 dated 23.09.2010 and Order No.06/2010-11 dated 26.10.2010 indicates that UDF was allowed to HIAL merely by placing reliance on the Concession Agreement and without analyzing the legal and economic impact of such levy on passengers/consumers. It is also glaring that earlier Ministry of Civil Aviation and later Authority allowed the levy of UDF without conducting any prudence check exercise and was solely based on HIAL's submissions.	difference and need to be recognized. This is incorrect. Authority had done a detailed analysis earlier as well in current determination of tariff of GHIAL. The entire process has been put up for public consultation as well.
	It is pertinent to note that in the Stakeholders' Meeting conducted on 29.09.2010 in context of the Consultation Paper No.07/2010-11, FIA had submitted as to how the HIAL (the airport operator) should endeavor to enhance its share of non-aeronautical revenues and leverage the non- aeronautical to bring down the aeronautical tariffs.	GHIAL has always made best efforts to increase revenue from all sources including non-aero revenues. It is not correct to question the endeavors of the GHIAL. The sharp increase in Non-Aero revenue post privatization goes on to show the endeavors done by private airport operators. GHIAL has taken various initiatives to increase its non- aeronautical revenues on a continuous basis since
		operations which are also reflected in the growth rates in non-aeronautical revenues. However under a single till there is no incentive for

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		airport operator to improve upon its non-aeronautical revenues. The Authority should approve a suitable till to further incentivize for improvement of the Non Aero growth.
14.75		
	Re.: Assets and Revenue of Wholly Owned Subsidiaries of HIAL	
	It is noteworthy that out of the land parcel of 5,450 acres, available with HIAL, the land being used for aeronautical purposes is 3,950 acres and that to be used for non- aeronautical purposes is 1,500 acres	The land parcel given was part of original bid conditions based on which investment was done in the airport.
	In the Consultation Paper, it has been revealed that HIAL has three (3) wholly owned subsidiaries, namely (a) GMR Hyderabad Aviation SEZ Limited;	The subsidiaries which have been referred are the 100% subsidiaries of GHIAL.
	 (b) GMR Hotels and Resorts Limited; and (c) Hyderabad Duty Free Retail Limited. HIAL's stake in other companies has not been revealed in the Consultation Paper. Authority has considered HIAL as a stand-alone entity without any consolidation 	The other than wholly owned ventures of GHIAL may not be relevant for the current consultation. All relevant details requisitioned by Authority in this regard have been submitted to the Authority.
	with its subsidiaries and accordingly, for the purpose of computing aeronautical tariff has not included the revenue and assets of any of the three aforementioned wholly owned subsidiaries (except revenue share from Duty Free)	GHIAL had filed for inclusion of all the wholly owned subsidiaries in tariff determination of GHIAL. However the Authority has considered GHIAL as standalone entity for determination of tariff.
	It is noteworthy that the Authority, for the purposes of the calculation of aeronautical tariff presented in this Consultation Paper, has not subtracted the value of the lands on which the	The methodology being suggested has no legal standing. Neither the concession, nor the AERA act has laid down any such methodology of removal of value of land.
	Hotel & Resorts and SEZ are being constructed by HIAL's wholly owned subsidiaries from the RAB and requested stakeholders' opinion in this regard.	This kind of treatment has never been seen in any regulatory tariff determination anywhere in world.
	Without prejudice, it is submitted that if the Authority decides to exclude the revenue of the	A conjoint reading of Concession Agreement, State Support Agreement and the Land lease Agreement
	wholly owned subsidiaries like GMR Hyderabad	indicates that the following concessions and assurances
	Aviation SEZ Limited and GMR Hotels & Resorts Limited, then it must also exclude the market value	have been granted to the GHIAL at the time of the grant of the right/concession to develop the Airport, namely:
	of land on which such assets (Hotel and SEZ) have been constructed for the purpose of computing RAB.	 The Concession Agreement defines and differentiates between mandatory 'Airport activities" consisting of aeronautical as well as

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It is noteworthy that HIAL has been granted long term lease of such huge parcel of land, which has been acquired under Land Acquisition Act, 1894 to construct the RGI Airport at a concessional rate. It seems that HIAL has sub-leased the land on which Hotel and SEZ are constructed at very low rate,	 non-aeronautical activities at the Airport and non-mandatory 'Non-Airport Activities' which the GHIAL is entitled to undertake at the Land (as defined under the Land Lease Agreement). Thus, in addition to the rights granted to the
understandably as GMR Hyderabad Aviation SEZ Limited and GMR Hotels & Resorts Limited are its wholly owned subsidiaries. However, undeniably GMR Hyderabad Aviation SEZ Limited and GMR Hotels & Resorts Limited are deriving economic benefits which would be proportionate to the	GHIAL for setting up and operating the RGIA, certain additional rights have been granted for the purpose of development of the additional land for purely commercial purposes not relating to the airport activity.
market value of land on which such Hotel and SEZ have been constructed. In other words, it is HIAL which has been granted the concession of the land parcel. By creating the wholly owned subsidiaries and sub-leasing at low rates, HIAL is channeling out the revenue stream while allowing wholly owned subsidiaries to operate on a location, which is commercially highly valuable.	 In this regard, as noticed hereinabove, the Concession Agreement also makes a distinction between "Airport Activities" and Non-Airport Activities". While Airport Activities has been defined under Article 1.1 of the Concession Agreement to mean "the provision, at or in relation to the Airport, of the activities set out at Schedule 3, Part 1 as amended from time to time, pursuant to ICAO guidelines, provided that any activities that are not materially similar to those contemplated in Schedule 3, Part 1 shall require the mutual agreement of the Parties", Non- Airport Activities means "the provision, at or in relation to the Airport, of the services set out at Schedule 3, Part 2". Schedule 3, Part 2 of the Concession Agreement provides for the Non- Airport activities which consist of real estate activities. These activities are totally unconnected with the Airport Activities.
	 In view of the above, it is pertinent to note that the land earmarked for development of Non- Airport Activities as well as the cost of setting up and carrying out the Non-Airport Activities is not to be considered for the purpose of arriving at 'total project costs' of the Airport. GHIAL is permitted to utilize the said land parcel out of the total Land for carrying out Non-Airport Activities which are purely commercial, real estate and totally unconnected with the Airport business.

SI.No.	FIA COMMENTS	GHIAL RESPONSE
	Single Till approach proposed to be followed by Authority for tariff determination	Conclusion: On a conjoint reading of Section 13(1)(a)(vi) of the AERA Act read with Article 10.2 and 10.3 of the Concession Agreement mandates regulating the Regulated Charges as defined in the Concession Agreement and not regulate any Other Charges in respect of the facilities and services provided at the Airport nor using the revenue therefrom to subsidize the Aero Charges. The value of the land earmarked for Non- Airport Activities (market or notional) cannot be included in nor deducted from the RAB and accordingly the revenue generated therefrom cannot be taken into account for cross subsidizing aeronautical tariff at airport .
	is in the right direction It is submitted that determination of aeronautical tariff warrants a comprehensive evaluation of the economic model and realities of the airport – both capital and revenue elements. HIAL's approach of Dual Till deserves to be discarded. In the Single Till Order, Authority has strongly made a case in favor of the determination of tariff on the basis of 'Single Till'. Under the Single Till basis, airport charges/aeronautical tariff are set with reference to the net costs of running the airport, taking into account other revenues arising at the airport i.e. non-aeronautical revenues.	The concession agreement of GHIAL based on which the investment was made allows an implied Dual Till. A conjoint reading of the following documents i.e. Concession Agreement, State Support Agreement and The Land lease Agreement indicates that the following concessions and assurances (relevant for the present queries) have been granted at the time of the grant of the right/concession to develop the Airport, namely: (i) Under Clause 10.2 read with Schedule 6 of the Concession Agreement, only Airport Charges defined as the 'Regulated Charges' are to be regulated by the IRA (i.e. AERA). (ii) Under Clause 10.2.4 of the Concession Agreement, the Regulated Charges shall be approved in consonance with ICAO Policies until the earlier of (a) the date that

SI.No. FIA COMMENTS	GHIAL RESPONSE
It is noteworthy that the Authority in its int Single Till Order has:	repaid and (b) fifteen (15) years from the Airport Opening
Comprehensively evaluated economic model and realities of the airport capital and revenue elements.	(11) by the second of the second s
Taken into account the legisl intent behind Section 13(1)(a)(v) of the AER	ative (iv) The Concession Agreement defines and differentiates
Concluded that the Single Till is the most appropriate for the economic regulation of airports in India	Airport and non-mandatory 'Non-Airport Activities' which major GHAIL is entitled to undertake at the Land (as defined under the Land Lease Agreement).
The criteria for determining tariff after takin account standards followed by several international airports (United Kingdom, Aus Ireland and South Africa) and prescribed by The Authority in its AERA Guidelines (para 4 followed the Single Till approach while layin the procedure for determination of ARR for Regulated Services. In this respect, the math be dealt with by the Authority considering t pronounced by the Constitutional Bench Hon'ble Supreme Court Judgment in PTC CERC reported as (2010) 4 SCC 60310 where specifically stated that regulation under an part of regulatory framework, intervenes even overrides the existing contracts betw the regulated entities inasmuch as it casts a	 The Concession Agreement (in terms of Article 10.2 and 10.3) has classified only two types of charges at RGIA i.e. Regulated Charges and Other Charges for the Airport Activities carried out at the Airport by the GHIAL consisting of both aeronautical as well as non-aeronautical activities. The Concession Agreement also defines "Regulated Charges" under Article 10.2.1 to mean only such Airport Charges as specified in Schedule 6 of the Concession Agreement and thus in terms of Schedule 6, Regulated Charges means the following charges i.e. (i) Landing Housing and Parking charges, (ii) Passenger Service Fee and (iii) User Development Fee. While Article 10.2 read with Schedule 6 of the Concession
statutory obligation on the regulated entitie align their existing and future contracts with said regulations.	Agreement induodies indi the IKA Le. AFKA indusudit to

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	The fundamental reasoning behind 'Single Till' approach is that if the consumers/passengers are offered cheaper air- fares, the volume of passengers is bound to increase leading to more foot-fall and probability of higher non-aeronautical revenue. The benefit of such non aeronautical revenue should be passed on to consumers and that can be assured only by way of lower aeronautical charges. It is a productive chain reaction which needs to be taken into account by the Authority.	approve/determine the Regulated Charges, Article 10.3 states unequivocally that except the Regulated Charges mentioned in Schedule 6, the GHIAL shall "be free without any restriction" to determine all Other Charges which are levied in respect of the activities defined as the Airport Activities at the Airport. Other Charges have been defined in Article 10.3 to include all facilities and services provided at the Airport except facilities and services in respect of which Regulated Charges are levied. In other words, the Concession Agreement provides that while AERA shall be empowered to regulate all Regulated Charges mentioned in Schedule 6, the power to
	FIA therefore submits as under:	determine all charges other than Regulated Charges rests
	Single Till Model ought to be applied to ALL airports regulated by the Authority regardless of whether it is a public or private airport or works under the PPP model and in spite of the concession agreements as the same is mandated by the statute.	with the GHIAL. Thus, the Concession Agreement makes a clear distinction between charges which require determination by AERA [i.e. Airport Charges (which are Regulated Charges) and those which can be fixed by the GHIAL itself i.e. Other Charges (which are also Airport Charges but are not subject to regulation by AERA). It is pertinent to note
	Single Till is in the public interest and will not hurt the investor's interest and given the economic and aviation growth that is projected for India, Fair Rate of Return alone will be enough to ensure continued investor's interest.	that Section 13 of the AERA Act which empowers AERA to determine the tariff of "aeronautical services" in respect of major airports mandates AERA to take various factors into consideration for determining the tariff. Section 13 of the AERA Act states as under:
		 "13. Functions of authority- (1) The Authority shall perform the following functions in respect of major airports, namely:- (a) to determine the tariff for the aeronautical services taking into consideration-
		 (i) the capital expenditure incurred and timely investment in improvement of airport facilities; (ii) the service provided, its quality and other relevant factors;
		 (iii) the cost for improving efficiency; (iv) economic and viable operation of major airports; (v) revenue received from services other than aeronautical services
		 (v) revenue received from services other than the aeronautical services; (vi) the concession offered by the Central Government in any agreement or memorandum of understanding or

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	otherwise; (vii) any other factor which may be relevant for the purposes of this Act: Provided that different tariff structures may be determined for different airports having regard to all or any of the above considerations specified at sub-clauses (i) to (vii)" (emphasis added)
	A perusal of Section 13 of the AERA Act makes it clear that while determining tariff for aeronautical services, AERA is statutorily obligated to consider the concession offered to the Airport Operators by the Central Government and the other agreements which form an integral and inalienable part of such concession.
	Reading of Section 13(1)(a)(vi) indicates that the concession granted by the Central Government has to be read into the AERA Act and all its provisions as well as limitations contained therein have to be considered by AERA while determining tariff including while deciding which services in a particular case and in terms of the relevant Concession, can be regulated by AERA.
	This is further confirmed by a reading of the proviso to Section 13(1)(a) of the AERA Act which states that "different tariff structures may be determined for different airports having regard to all or any of the considerations specified at sub-clauses (i) to(vii)" in the said section. In other words, the AERA Act recognizes that a straightjacket applicability of its provisions to all major airports is not intended and grants flexibility to AERA to determine tariff structures to different airports having regard to various considerations including the concession granted by the Central Government.
	Thus, even though the AERA Act empowers AERA to regulate tariff for Aeronautical Service as defined in Section 2(a) of the AERA Act, in case any concession has already been granted by the Central Government, AERA is statutorily mandated to consider such concession.
	In the case of RGIA, since one of the concession granted by the Central Government is that save for the 'Regulated Charges', the GHIAL shall be free without any restriction

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		to determine all Other Charges. Thus, on a reading of Section 13(1)(a)(vi) of the AERA Act read with Article 10.2 and 10.3 of the Concession Agreement, AERA is only empowered to regulate the Regulated Charges as defined in the Concession Agreement (as an exception to the mandate of the Act which is recognized and allowed by the Act itself) and cannot regulate any Other Charges in respect of the facilities and services provided at the Airport including the other Aeronautical Services as defined in Section 2(a) of the AERA Act. By adopting a single till AERA is limiting the return which can accrue to airport operator on Non Aeronautical part or on unregulated charges. This is an indirect regulation of activities not mandated under AERA act or concession agreement.
IV	Levy of User Development Fee at RGI Airport is legally untenable	
	It is to be noted that Clause 6.8.5 of AERA Guidelines in no uncertain terms provides that UDF is a revenue enhancing measure to allow Fair Rate of Return to the Airport Operator. It is not clear as on what basis the Authority has proposed to levy UDF at RGI Airport for the purpose of development and expansion work undertaken in the past. The Concession Agreement cannot be relied upon to allow levy of UDF (a revenue enhancing measure) in view of the expressed provisions of AERA Guidelines. It is settled position of law that regulations override the prior contractual arrangements.	The direction 5 of AERA has clearly laid down that : 6.8.4. The Airport Operator(s) shall also submit information relating to the list of services or charges having a sub-cap within the overall yield per passenger, such as User Development Fee. 6.8.5. The User Development Fee (UDF) and other aeronautical charges cover the same range of services, and therefore UDF shall be considered as a revenue enhancing measure to ensure economic viability of the airport operations and shall be allowed only in specific cases upon due consideration. Explanation: In a case where the Authority approves the proposal to levy UDF, it shall determine the rate of UDF so that the revenue is so enhanced so as to ensure that the Airport Operator is able to obtain Fair Rate of Return on the RAB, as per these Guidelines, over the relevant period. A5.9.2
		A5.9.2 Airport Operator(s) shall detail the specification of tariffs in terms of tariff types proposed (tariff for Regulated Service(s), user development fee (UDF), development fee

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	Further, in a long term PPP project, it remains unclear as to how the Authority can allow the funding to be borne by the unsuspecting rate payers, whereas the equity holders are in control of the assets. It is imperative to note that the lack of diligent contracting, supervision and reporting, if any, by HIAL, cannot lead to the detriment of the consumers at large. It is well recognised regulatory position that utilities are free to decide their plans of investment for improvement of system or expansion to meet the demand including upgradation and maintenance for a better and quality supply. In appropriate cases, the <u>Regulator may disallow such cases of utility and it is</u> for the utility to bear the brunt of such investment	 (DF), as well as tariff categories proposed for each tariff type (based on weight of aircraft, domestic / international passengers, etc.). A5.9.4. Where the Airport Operator considers that a UDF charge is required, it shall specify the proposed UDF levy for each Tariff Year of the Control Period as part of the overall yield per passenger" The basis of the fair rate of return has been deliberated in detail in consultation paper and based on entitlement UDF has been approved. In a PPP project the basic premise is that the project is entitled to be fairly remunerated for the investment to ensure the project operates on a profitable and viable basis. Non – adhering to this basic philosophy will negate the approach to PPPs. The other points discussed herein are not comprehensible.
	and it cannot pass it on to consumers.11 It is noteworthy that that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgment of Consumer Online Foundation vs. Union of India & Others reported as (2011) 5 SCC 36012 has categorically noted that there can be no contractual relationship between the passengers embarking at an airport and the airport operator with regard to the up-gradation, expansion or development of the airport which is to be funded or financed by UDF.	UDF is not a funding or financing source. UDF is revenue stream from passengers to airport operators. FIA has mixed up UDF and ADF. GHIAL is only levying UDF. However we shall also like to clarify that any charge whether by way of UDF or ADF allowed by the Authority need to be implemented and the user need to pay the same.

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	In fact, the UDF which is being levied at the RGI Airport towards development and expansion of the airport facilities is in the nature of cess or tax. It is settled position of law that any levy or compulsory exaction which is in the nature of tax/cess cannot be levied without a statutory foundation/charging section, as laid down in a catena of judgments by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Further, no tax, fee or any compulsory charge can be imposed by any bye- law, rule or regulation unless the statute under which the subordinate legislation is made specifically authorises the imposition. There is no room for intendment.	Again, FIA has mixed up between ADF and UDF. GHIAL is levying UDF which is revenue in nature and is not used directly for development and expansion of airport facilities. However we shall also like to clarify that any charge whether by way of UDF or ADF allowed by the Authority need to be implemented and the user need to pay the same.
1	In view of the foregoing, it is submitted that	
	Neither AAI Act, Aircraft Act, 1934 nor AERA Act nowhere provide for provision of determination or levy of UDF on passengers.	This statement is not correct that UDF is not allowed by AAI Act, Aircraft Act, 1934 or AERA Act. UDF is allowed under Aircraft rules. Rule 89 reads as under: User Development Fee. —The licensee may, - (i) levy and collect at a major airport the User Development Fee at such rate as may be determined under clause (b) of sub- section (1) of section 13 of the Airports Economic Regulatory Authority of India Act, 2008; (ii) levy and collect at any other airport the User Development Fees at such rate as the Central Government may specify. [Substituted by – GSR No. 732(E) dated 02-11-2004
í.		Amended by GSR No. 757 dated 14-10-2009]
	Authority in the present Consultation Paper has not deliberated upon the rationale for levying UDF. It is submitted that Authority is bound under Section 13(4)(c) of the AERA Act to fully document and explain its decision.	There has been extensive discussion on UDF in document and there UDF has been referred 258 times in document.
V	Regulatory Period ought to be determined prospectively	
	The Authority is overlooking that the HIAL has caused inordinate delay in submitting the details of project cost and relevant information for determination of aeronautical tariff which has:	There has been no delay in submission of tariff proposal. The proposal was submitted in the timelines approved by Authority

10.	FIA COMMENTS	GHIAL RESPONSE
	Diminished the effective Control Period to 31 months from 5 years;	There has been no delay from GHIAL side
	Led to exponential increase in aeronautical tariff (40% to 400% on a component to component basis) of RGI Airport with the past charges of last 29 months recoverable in the next 31 months from the future passengers and consumer including the airlines. This approach is unacceptable as it would increase the operational expenditure of the airlines and rendering its operations economically unviable.	There is no such impact as being referred. In fact the tariff as proposed by Authority has reduced entitlement in balance period.
	As noted above, Authority has proposed to allow HIAL to recover the Pre-control period losses to the tune of Rs. 333 Crores under the Single Till Model by adding the same to the ARR of HIAL thereby stretching the present tariff prior to 01.04.2011. There seems to be no legal or regulatory basis for:-	Rationale for this has been already been explained
	Firstly, to allow the alleged losses suffered by HIAL prior to the control period;	
	5econdly, to allow the carrying costs of Rs. 73 crores (for period 1.4.2011-1.09.2013) on alleged losses.	
	Depreciation up to 100% is contrary to the AERA Guidelines	

SI.No.	FIA COMMENTS	GHIAL RESPONSE
	HIAL has calculated depreciation up to 100% of the value of the asset based on the assumption that no compensation will be received towards the value of the net block of assets upon transfer of the airport upon completion of term. This is in contravention of the AERA Guidelines (Para 5.3.3) which allows depreciation to be calculated to the extent of 90% of the assets. Considering depreciation up to 100% value would result in an artificial increase in the depreciation charge and thereby have an adverse impact of increasing the tariff. It is submitted that Authority should consider 10% residual value of the assets for computing depreciation as mentioned in the AERA Guidelines. As per data provided in the Consultation Paper, considering depreciation up to 90% only would bring the Target revenue by 1%.	Depreciation is a return of capital and should lead to ensure adequate provision for replacement of assets. Hence the same needs to be allowed to 100%. Authority has already clarified this in consultation paper 09/2013-14 as under: 13.15. The calculation of depreciation, submitted by HIAL in the tariff model, presently considers depreciation up to 90%, which is in line with the provisions of the Airport Guidelines vide Para 5.3.3. However, HIAL has requested the Authority to allow them to depreciate the assets up to 100%. According to the Authority's understanding, the Concession Agreement does not appear to include compensation towards the value of the net block of assets upon transfer of the airport upon completion of term. The Authority also notes that the depreciation of RAB. The Authority after careful consideration of these provisions feels that keeping a residual value (of 10% of RAB) may not be required. Having considered this issue in its totality, the Authority tentatively proposes to permit depreciation of 100% of RAB.
VII	Tax savings has not been considered for determining Cost of Debt	

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Sl.No.	FIA COMMENTS	GHIAL RESPONSE
	The present Consultation Paper does not provide a breakup of the rupee term Ioan and ECB Ioan over the historic period and forecast period to calculate the actual cost of debt. It is noteworthy that cost of debt is the effective rate that a company pays on its current debt post adjustment for tax savings. However, based on aforementioned proposal of the Authority and review of Consultation Paper, it appears that cost of debt is not adjusted for any tax savings. Post adjustment of such tax savings (assuming tax rate at 30%) in cost of debt, WACC will reduce from 10.68% to 8.39%. It is submitted that Authority should factor such tax saving for computing WACC of HIAL. It is submitted that reduction in WACC from 10.69% to 8.39% will reduce target revenue by 11% (and will reduce the present value of Target Revenue by 17%).	The AERA guidelines in Direction no.5 clearly state the Cost of Debt in the calculation of WACC is pre-tax.
VII	General Operating Expenditure and non- aeronautical revenue have been forecasted without evaluating the commercial and financial terms in detail. It is submitted that Operating Expenses (71%) and Non-aeronautical Revenue (50%) are <i>inter alia</i> the major components for determining Target Revenue. Thus, the Authority ought to evaluate these components in detail by evaluating commercial and financial details of each expense and income/revenue head.	The Authority has sought necessary documents/certificates whenever the requirement was felt and we have submitted the same for scrutiny of the Authority. The basis of aforesaid allegation is not clear wherein the claim is being made that Authority has not evaluated the terms in detail. All relevant details were submitted to the Authority. The opex is based on actual amount spent by GHIAL extrapolated on a basis which is evaluated by Authority. One of the components of the growth is inflation which is based on the projections of RBI Another aspect is traffic which is based on a study conducted in this regard.
1	Re. Operating Expenses:	

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	For the purpose of projecting operating costs/expense for balance control period, real increase in operating costs for HIAL for FY 2011-12 and FY 2010-11 comes to approximately 3.35% and 1.48% respectively. Further, average real increase for the period FY 2009-10 to FY 2011-12 has been computed by the Authority which comes out to be 2.42%. Hence, Authority has considered an increase of 3.0% for computing projected operating expenses, over the calculated average increase of 2.42% would provide for some generic allowance for uncertainties.	The detailed rationale of each and every component has already been submitted to Authority. The operating expenses increase as the facility gets older. This factor needs to be considered in tariff determination. When the facility was new many equipment were under defect liability period / Warranty. The above is no more in vogue and these expenses will increase significantly. These factors need to be kept in mind while projecting the future expenditure.
	Re. Non-aeronautical Revenue: Non-aeronautical Revenue for FY 2013-14 to FY 2015-16 has been proposed by considering a 'year on year' (YoY) escalation of 5% and passenger growth rate, on total non-aeronautical revenue (minus the interest income) in FY 2012-13.	Statement of facts/Analysis – no comments.
VIII	Revenue from Cargo service ought to be treated as Aeronautical Revenue	
	FIA is conscious /aware that Authority has proposed to follow the Single Till Model for determination of aeronautical tariffs at RGI Airport. Thus, the proposal to treat the revenue arising from cargo services as non-aeronautical revenue won't materially affect the inclusion of revenue for determination of the Target Revenue. However, treatment of revenue arising from aeronautical service contrary to the statutory mandate, irrespective of the Till to be followed, is crucial for precedential value in the sector.	Cargo must be kept outside the regulations. Section 13(1)(a)(vi) of the AERA Act read with Article 10.2 and 10.3 of the Concession Agreement mandates regulating the Regulated Charges as defined in the Concession Agreement. AERA act contemplates that the concession needs to be taken into consideration in fixing the charge. The clause 13(1)(a)(iv) reads as under: CHAPTERD Power AND PUNCTIONS of THE AUTHORITY 13.(1) The Authority shall perform the following functions in respect of major alreads, and (a) to determine the tartiff for the acronantical services taking into consideration— (4) to determine the tartiff for the acronantical services taking into consideration— (b) the capital expenditure incurred and timely investment in improvement of alread facilities.

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		 (ii) the service provided, its quality and other relevant factors; (iii) the cost for improving efficiency; (rv) economic and viable operation of major airports; (v) revenue received from services other than the aeronautical services; (vf) the concession offered by the Central Government in any agreement or memorandum of understanding or otherwise;
		The Concession Agreement contemplates regulations of only the Regulated Charges by the Authority as mentioned in the Schedule 6 of Concession Agreement. The AERA act also contemplated that the concession should be adhered. As such the provisions of the concession agreement needs to be adhered.
		Provisions of Concession Agreement:
		Only the following Regulated Charges as enumerated in the Schedule 6 of the Concession Agreement are to be regulated by the Independent Regulatory Authority (IRA):
		 Landing Charges Parking Charges Housing Charges Passenger Service Fee User Development Fee
		Clause 10.2 of the Concession Agreement reads as under: 10.2 Airport Charges
		10.2.4 From the date <u>the IRA has the power to</u> <u>approve the Regulated Charges</u> , HIAL shall be required to obtain approval thereof from the IRA. In this regard HIAL shall submit to the IRA, in accordance with any regulations framed by the IRA, details of the Regulated Charges proposed to be imposed for the next succeeding relevant period together with such information
		as the IRA may require for review iii. Freedom to determine Other Charges for other

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		facilities or services:
		Clause 10.3 of the Concession Agreement reads as follows:
		10.3 Other Charges
		 HIAL and/or Service Provider Right Holders shall be <u>free without any restriction</u> to determine the charges to be imposed in respect of the facilities and services provided at the Airport or on the Site, other than the facilities and services in respect of which Regulated Charges are levied. As such Authority is not mandated to regulate any Other Charges in respect of the facilities and services provided at the Airport. As such the Cargo should be outside the regulations.
		GoAP also has clarified that Cargo, Ground Handling and Fuel should not be regulated. GHIAL has accordingly classified Cargo assets as non-aero and the revenue therefrom also has been classified as non-aero. In our view this is what is contemplated under the Concession Agreement and the same is requested be accepted by Authority.
IX	Re. Fuel farm Service	
	Authority has noted that Airlines are presently making use of the fuel farm services at RGI Airport, Hyderabad and they would have entered into agreements with the fuel farm service provider, wherein the tariffs would have been indicated to the airlines. AERA is not aware of any reasonable objections from the users of fuel farm services (Clause 6 of CGF Guidelines). Thus, in view of the reasonableness of these agreements, AERA has proposed to determine the tariffs for fuel farm service provided by HIAL at RGI Airport, Hyderabad under light touch approach.	The Authority has provided chance to all the stakeholders to submit their comments/responses on the issues related to CP 09/2013-14 and called for written evidence based feedback, comments and suggestions from stakeholders on the proposed stand of the Authority.
х	Allowing Inflation at various levels has multiplier impact on Tariff	

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	It appears that HIAL is also considering an inflationary increase in the proposed Yield Per Passenger ("YPP") for the balance years of the current control period. Since inflation has been considered on YPP and operating expense is one of the components to determine YPP. Therefore, in order to avoid manifold impact of inflation, it is submitted that all the expenditure should be delinked from inflation.	There is no double impact of inflation as being envisaged by FIA.
XI	Re. HIAL's monopolistic approach and 'Doctrine of Essential Facilities' It is submitted that such enormous hike in tariff by a monopolist HIAL may be viewed as 'abuse of its	These are baseless allegations.
	dominance' and accordingly liable under section 4 of the Competition Act, 2002 ("Competition Act"). Further, the Competition Act promulgates the "economic development of the country" by establishment of a Commission to, amongst other things, protect the interests of the consumers. Levy of such exponential charges by a monopolist is clearly against consumer interests, and thus, is against the basic premise of competition law in India.	There is nothing to show abuse of monopolistic power being abused. The regulatory framework and scrutiny by the regulator is meant to ensure avoidance of dominance, if any.
XII	Authority should conduct/commission its own study for assessing the claims of HIAL	
	It is noteworthy that purpose of appointing an external consultant is to enhance the credibility of data being relied upon by obtaining written reasonable assurance from an independent source. However, such objective will not be met if such external consultant can be influenced by other parties, more specifically company managers/directors. In addition to technical competence, independence is the most important factor in establishing the credibility of the opinion. To bring independence and objectivity to the process, the Authority should directly engage external consultants in order to obtain reasonable assurance on the data being relied upon.	Authority has already appointed consultant for review of the tariff filing of GHIAL. The details relating to all aspects have been submitted in great detail and each and every component has been closely scrutinized by the Authority and its consultants. The data being submitted are audited results of GHIAL with projections. As such the question of influence does not arise. As regards to traffic projections since the same is subject to true up there is no impact on this account as well.

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	It is submitted that the Authority ought to conduct/commission its own study for allocation of assets and not accept HIAL's submission on as it is basis. The Authority has been contemplating to commission its own study since April, 2012 when it first issued the DIAL Tariff Order (No.3/2012-13). It is regrettable that the Authority has yet again adopted the stance of commissioning its independent study at a later date. It is to be noted that in the Appeals16 pending before the Hon'ble Airports Economic Regulatory Authority Appellate Tribunal, the issues pertaining to engagement of consultants/experts by the Authority instead of placing absolute reliance on consultants engaged by the airports operators have been raised and are pending adjudication.	The details relating to all aspects have been submitted in great detail and each and every component has been closely scrutinized by the Authority and its consultants.
	Similarly, Authority should independently scrutinize the claims of HIAL with respect to Operating Expenditure (71% of the HIAL's claim towards ARR).	The details relating to all expenditure have been submitted in great detail and each and every component has been closely scrutinized by the Authority and its consultants.
XIII	Re: True-up exercise	
	In view of the foregoing, it is submitted that Authority should not leave everything to true up and attempt to make all the projections and assessments as accurately possible on the basis of available data	There is nothing like accurate forecast. Forecast is bound to be different from the actual figures. The Authority should take all factors into consideration and accordingly make provisions of true up for selected items.
	Judgment of APTEL in the case of BSES Rajdhani Power Limited vs. Delhi Electricity Regulatory Commission reported as 2009 ELR (APTEL) 88017 is to be considered	No comments
XIV	Discrepancies in CP No.09/2013-14	
	Tax computation: Tax charge used by the Authority in determining TR (Table 96 and 97 CP No. 09/2013-14) substantially differs with submission made by HIAL. No calculation has been made available by the Authority.	Table 97 has no tax numbers. The difference in table 95 and 96 is due to Different Tills
	Number of passengers : The Consultation Paper does not provide details of number of used to calculate the YPP.	All requisite details submitted to the Authority

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	Cost of debt : The Consultation Paper does not provide the breakup of the rupee term loan and ECB loan over the historic period and forecast period to calculate the actual cost of debt.	All requisite details submitted to the Authority
	Existing Yield per passenger is not available: In absence of the same, increase in YPP cannot be determined.	All requisite details submitted to the Authority
	Discrepancy in Non-Aeronautical revenue of FY12: Total Non-Aeronautical revenue of Rs. 178.4 crores considered by Authority for FY 2011-12 (as per Table 87 of CP No.9 of 2013-14) is not matching with aggregate of Revenue mentioned in Table Nos. 71 to 81 and Table 83 and the tables mentioned in paragraph Nos. 17.2.4 and 17.3.4 of the Consultation Paper.	Table 87 is non-aero considered by Authority, whereas previous tables, table 71-81 and table 83, are that proposed by GHIAL. There is difference between non-aeronautical revenue proposed by GHIAL and that considered by the Authority.
	In addition to the above submissions, it is respectfully submitted that airlines and consequently passengers will have to bear the burden of increase in Aeronautical Tariff as proposed by HIAL and the Authority (40% to 400% on a component to component basis). It is noteworthy that Airlines and passengers must not be burdened with any tariff to be collected to fund the capital investments of a private concessionaire.	 This is a strange request that airport operator must not be reimbursed for the capital expenditure (done by private concessionaire). This defies logic. Any charges approved by Authority whether ADF or UDF is critical for providing fair remuneration for the private operator and the continued operation of airport. However we will like to clarify that GHIAL currently is levying UDF (not ADF) which is revenue receipt by nature whereas what FIA is referring is ADF which is of the nature of capital grant. There has not been any increase in Aero charges of landing and parking for last 10 years, except 10% increase in 2009 and even if we take pure inflation the charges should go up considerably.

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	The Authority is aware that airlines have been going through difficult times with high prices of crude oil. Increase in aeronautical tariff as proposed by the Authority will erode airlines capabilities to increase fares to sustain its operational capabilities. It is submitted that it would be unfair to allow such increase to fund the gap of the private airport operator especially after the privatization has taken place. Any additional funding gap should be bridged through debt- financing, subsidy by Government, or additional equity. It seems that increase in aeronautical tariff is a means to avoid any of the said options to burden the passengers.	The charges of landing and parking even with proposed increase will be lower than the charges of Chennai and Kolkata airports. Increased funding source will not mean revenue from GHIAL. The revenue can be achieved only by charges.
	It is pertinent to note that the Authority must also take into account the difficulties being faced by the airlines and passengers before granting levies to the airport operators. Considering the fragile financials of the Airlines, UDF will inhibit Airlines' ability to raise fares. As Airlines have suffered losses significantly in the last two years due to high ATF and recent depreciation of the rupee, there is a need for Airlines to raise fares to recoup the past losses, rather than fund the Airport development program which is the responsibility of the airport operator. HIAL by way of its present proposal is acting to the detriment to airlines and the passengers.	A better infrastructure is essential for the growth of aviation. This also means saving due to efficient operations and cost saving by way of lower turnaround time and no hovering time. This aspect needs to be kept in mind. Entire privatization of the airports will fall apart if they are not properly remunerated. If PPP entity is allowed to continuously incur losses it will reach a stage when there will be no one forthcoming to invest in sector. This will mean lack of growth opportunities for airlines, delays at airport (eating into the precious time of airlines,) long hovering time (resulting in huge fuel bills). Airlines must appreciate the good work done by airport and try to focus on other items like fuel etc. that are the most critical areas to improve their bottom-line.

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	Annual concession fee is being paid by the HIAL to Gol as a part of its costs which it willingly agreed to incur to win the concession under a competitive bidding process. As such, this would have been factored in the bid financial model and must not be a source of additional risk or financial burden being transferred to users. Revenue that is earned by the airport has already factored in it a fair return on investment. Subsequently, what the airport chooses to do with that revenue should not be ploughed back as a cost to the users in any form.	This is as per the terms of the Concession Agreement. This is expenditure and all expenditures need to be allowed. There is no expenditure which can go unremunerated.
	FIA reiterates its submission that there is a critical relationship between passenger traffic and growth of the civil aviation sector. What would benefit both the airport as well as the airlines is a reasonable and transparent passenger tariff, both direct and indirect – since then the airlines will be able to attract more passengers and the airports would benefit both through higher collection of aeronautical charges as also enhanced non-aeronautical revenue at the airports. In our view, the airport should be regarded as a single business as its aeronautical and non-aeronautical and non-aeronautical revenues are intertwined. In this backdrop, FIA strongly endorses the views of the Authority to follow the "Single Till" as the basis for determining airport revenue, without any carve-buts whatsoever. It is submitted that the Single Till Model adopted by the Authority warrants a comprehensive evaluation of the economic model and realities of the airport – both capital and revenue elements.	 GHIAL is allowed a fixed entitlement irrespective of traffic. GHIAL is mandated to be regulated under DUAL till both under concession as well as under AERA act. The detailed rationale of the same is given below. However we will also like to reiterate that Single Till leaves no incentive with airport operator to improve its Non Aeronautical revenues Rationale for Adoption of Dual till: A conjoint reading of the concession documents, indicates that the following concessions and assurances (relevant for the present queries) have been granted at the time of the grant of the right/concession to develop the Airport, namely: (i) Under Clause 10.2 read with Schedule 6 of the Concession Agreement, only Airport Charges defined as the 'Regulated Charges' are to be regulated by the IRA (i.e. AERA). (ii) Under Clause 10.2.4 of the Concession Agreement, the Regulated Charges shall be approved in consonance with ICAO Policies until the earlier of (i) the date that outstanding Debt in respect of the Initial Phase has been repaid and (ii) fifteen (15) years from the Airport Opening Date. (iii) In view of Clause 10.3 of the Concession Agreement, direction of the top of the and the top of the additional the top of the additional top

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	the GHIAL shall "be free without any restriction" to determine all Other Charges which are levied in respect of all other facilities and services at the Airport.
	(iv) The Concession Agreement defines and differentiates between mandatory 'Airport Activities" consisting of aeronautical as well as non-aeronautical activities at the Airport and non-mandatory 'Non-Airport Activities' which GHAIL is entitled to undertake at the Land (as defined under the Land Lease Agreement).
	 The Concession Agreement (in terms of Article 10.2 and 10.3) has classified only two types of charges at RGIA i.e. Regulated Charges and Other Charges for the Airport Activities carried out at the Airport by the GHIAL consisting of both aeronautical as well as non- aeronautical activities. The Concession Agreement also defines "Regulated Charges" under Article 10.2.1 to mean only such Airport Charges as specified in Schedule 6 of the Concession Agreement and thus in terms of Schedule 6, Regulated Charges means the following charges i.e. (i) Landing Housing and Parking charges, (ii) Passenger Service Fee and (iii) User Development Fee.
	2. While Article 10.2 read with Schedule 6 of the Concession Agreement mandates that the IRA i.e. AERA (pursuant to being empowered for the purpose) shall approve/determine the Regulated Charges, Article 10.3 states unequivocally that except the Regulated Charges mentioned in Schedule 6, the GHIAL shall "be free without any restriction" to determine all Other Charges which are levied in respect of the activities defined as the Airport Activities at the Airport. Other Charges have been defined in Article 10.3 to include all facilities and services provided at the Airport except facilities and services in respect of which Regulated Charges are levied. In other words, the Concession Agreement provides that while AERA shall be empowered to regulate all Regulated Charges mentioned in Schedule 6, the power to determine all charges other than Regulated Charges rests with the GHIAL.

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	3. Thus, the Concession Agreement makes a clear distinction between charges which require determination by AERA [i.e. Airport Charges (which are Regulated Charges) and those which can be fixed by the GHIAL itself i.e. Other Charges (which are also Airport Charges but are not subject to regulation by AERA).
	4. It is pertinent to note that Section 13 of the AERA Act which empowers AERA to determine the tariff of "aeronautical services" in respect of major airports mandates AERA to take various factors into consideration for determining the tariff. A perusal of Section 13 of the AERA Act makes it clear that while determining tariff for aeronautical services, AERA is statutorily obligated to consider the concession offered to the Airport Operators by the Central Government and the other agreements which form an integral and inalienable part of such concession.
	Reading of Section 13(1)(a)(vi) indicates that the concession granted by the Central Government has to be read into the AERA Act and all its provisions as well as limitations contained therein have to be considered by AERA while determining tariff including while deciding which services in a particular case and in terms of the relevant Concession, can be regulated by AERA.
	This is further confirmed by a reading of the proviso to Section 13(1)(a) of the AERA Act which states that "different tariff structures may be determined for different airports having regard to all or any of the considerations specified at sub-clauses (i) to(vii)" in the said section. In other words, the AERA Act recognizes that a straightjacket applicability of its provisions to all major airports is not intended and grants flexibility to AERA to determine tariff structures to different airports having regard to various considerations including the concession granted by the Central Government.
	5. Thus, even though the AERA Act empowers AERA to regulate tariff for Aeronautical Service as defined in Section 2(a) of the AERA Act, in case any concession has already been granted by the Central Government, AERA is statutorily mandated to consider such concession.

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
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	Further, it is submitted that order passed by an administrative authority, affecting the rights of parties, must be a speaking order supported with reasons. It is well settled position of law19 that:	In the case of RGIA, since one of the concession granted by the Central Government is that save for the 'Regulated Charges', the GHIAL shall be free without any restriction to determine all Other Charges. Thus, on a reading of Section 13(1)(a)(vi) of the AERA Act read with Article 10.2 and 10.3 of the Concession Agreement, AERA is only empowered to regulate the Regulated Charges as defined in the Concession Agreement (as an exception to the mandate of the Act which is recognized and allowed by the Act itself) and cannot regulate any Other Charges in respect of the facilities and services provided at the Airport including the other Aeronautical Services as defined in Section 2(a) of the AERA Act. By adopting a single till AERA is limiting the return which can accrue to airport operator on Non Aeronautical part or on unregulated charges. This is an indirect regulation of activities not mandated under AERA act or concession agreement. This comment relates to Authority. However following are our views: Currently, the Authority has come up with the Consultation Paper and not final Order. At this stage the Authority is giving all the stakeholders chance to submit written evidence based feedback. The final order is expected to be based on rationale and resoning, after considering views of all including the concerns of GHIAL
1	Reasons ought to be recorded even by a quasi- judicial authority.	and also the concession agreements. no comments
	Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the wider principle of justice that justice must not only be done it must also appear to be done as well.	no comments .
	Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative power.	no comments
	Insistence on reason is a requirement for both accountability and transparency.	no comments

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	Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and succinct.	Consultation paper discusses every issue in great detail.
	A pretence of reasons or `rubber-stamp reasons' is not to be equated with a valid decision making process.	no comments
	Requirement of giving reasons is virtually a part of 'Due Process'.	no comments

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FICCI Comments	GHIAL Response	
Need for Investment in Airport Infrastructure The vital need for investment in the area of infrastructure cannot be exaggerated. It is estimated that Indian airports would require an investment of about Rs 67,500 Crores during the Twelfth Five Year Plan, of which around Rs 50,000 Crore is likely to be contributed by the private sector. It is critical that the investments should be made not just to address the existing capacity constraints at airports, but should also build capacity to accommodate the projected growth in the next decade. Needless to say, this can only be possible with the continued participation of the private sector in the PPP projects. It is well-recognized that airports require massive investments that are lumpy in nature. Historically, in India, airport-capacity has lagged demand, thus causing severe constraints in service quality. From this perspective, building world-class airport infrastructure and adequate capacity planning for the future need could be viewed as a welcome change. Therefore, preserving the interest of investors is of prime importance, towards achieving future growth in airports and other segments of infrastructure.	We appreciate the concern raised by FICCI for investment in airport infrastructure and request the Authority to abide by the Concession Agreement which will send positive signal to investor community. There is an implied Dual till mandated by concession and its earnestly requested that the same should be allowed by the Authority.	
Concession Agreement and State Support Agreement We understand that the key agreements governing the working of the Hyderabad International Airport Ltd (HIAL) include (a) Concession Agreement, (b) Land Lease Agreement, and (c) State Support Agreement among others. These agreements played a critical role in forming the business decisions at the time of taking up the project. We are of the view that such agreements should be honoured so that confidence of the investors does not get weakened.	Concession Agreement is the most sacrosanct because that is the basis on which investment has been made.This is critical in attracting the investment. The private sector has given an airport which is ranked amongst best in world by ACI.5.00 4.75 4.50 4.25 4.00 HYD HAK WUH TSN SYX HET HRB KHN NGO CUNAirport NameCountryAirport Code	



FICCI Comments	GHIAL Response		
	HYDERABAD RAJIV GANDHI	1	
	INT AIRPORT	INDIA	HYD
	HAIKOU AIRPORT	CHINA	НАК
	WUHAN AIRPORT	CHINA	WUH
	TIANJIN AIRPORT	CHINA	TSN
	SANYA AIRPORT	CHINA	SYX
	HOHHOT AIRPORT	CHINA	HET
	HARBIN AIRPORT	CHINA	HRB
	NANCHANG AIRPORT	CHINA	KHN
	NAGOYA CHUBU CENTRAIR		
	INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT	JAPAN	NGO
	CANCUN INTERNATIONAL		
	AIRPORT	MEXICO	CUN
	GHIAL must be rewarded for th However in the current consult on Equity of 16% is even lower promised on privatization (equi	ation pape than 18.33	r the return % IRR
	on Equity).		

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As regards the Return on Equity (RoE), FICCI would like to suggest the broad direction on the expected return and factors leading to calculation of a fair return.	undamental premise of the said concession. es to the concession have recognised,
return on the capital deployed by private players, commensurate to the risk taken.The Parti accepted• In particular, airports are often perceived as more riskyabove, the	and acted on the same. In view of the e Authority is requested to approve a 18.33% Equity IRR (equivalent to return on 24%).

Subject	IATA's Comments	GHIAL response
(1)	• IATA agrees with the Authority's treatment of	It's earnestly requested that Cargo, ground handling
Recognition	revenues from cargo service accruing to the	and Fuel should not be regulated by Authority.
of revenue	airport operator as aeronautical revenue. In	
from cargo	addition, IATA asserts that since cargo service is	The rationale of the same is as under:
services	defined as an aeronautical service under the	
	AERA Act to be regulated by AERA, any revenue	Section 13(1)(a)(vi) of the AERA Act read with Article
	(e.g. concession fee, revenue share, rental etc)	10.2 and 10.3 of the Concession Agreement
	derived by the airport from provision of this	mandates regulating the Regulated Charges as
	aeronautical service (regardless of whether the	defined in the Concession Agreement.
	service is provided by the airport itself, by	
	concessionaires or by the airport's appointed	Section 13 of the AERA Act states as under:
	agent) should be treated as aeronautical	"13. Functions of authority- (1) The Authority shall
	revenue	perform the following functions in respect of major
(2)	• Under the AERA Act, ground handling service	airports, namely:-
Recognition	is an aeronautical service. Regardless of who	(a) to determine the tariff for the aeronautical
of revenue	provides the service, the airport has the	services taking into consideration-
from ground	monopoly power to affect the cost which is a	(i) the capital expenditure incurred and timely
handling	significant component of industry cost. In order	
services	to curb any monopolistic tendency of the	investment in improvement of airport facilities;
	airport to treat ground handling services as a convenient source of revenue which could then	(ii) the service provided, its quality and other
	lead to runaway cost for the airlines and the	relevant factors;
	industry, IATA asserts that revenue in any form	(iii) the cost for improving efficiency;
	(including royalties and concession revenue)	(iv) economic and viable operation of major
	derived by the airport from ground handling	airports; (v) revenue received from services other
	services should be treated as aeronautical	than aeronautical services
	revenue.	(v) revenue received from services other than the
(3)	• IATA agrees with the Authority's treatment of	aeronautical services;
Recognition	revenues from fuel services as aeronautical	Fig. 1. Statistical Contraction and Annual Information in the Statistic Contraction of the Statistic
of revenue	revenue. In addition, IATA asserts that a	(vi) the concession offered by the Central
from fuel	primary reason for fuel services to be regarded	Government in any agreement or memorandum of
services	as an aeronautical service is because the	understanding or otherwise;
	airport can abuse its monopolistic position in	(vii) any other factor which may be relevant for the
	this area and cause fuel costs to go up	purposes of this Act:
	unreasonably and unnecessarily. Hence, any	Provided that different tariff structures may be
	form of revenue derived by the airport from	determined for different airports having regard to all
	fuel services (e.g. concession fee, rentals, fuel	or any of the above considerations specified at sub-
	facility fees etc.) should be treated as	clauses (i) to (vii)" (emphasis added)
	aeronautical revenue to curb the ability of the	
	airport to treat fuel services as a convenient	
	source of revenue that will have repercussions	A perusal of Section 13 of the AERA Act makes it clear
	on the cost efficiency of the aviation industry.	that while determining tariff for aeronautical
		services, AERA is statutorily obligated to consider the

Subject	IATA's Comments	GHIAL response
		concession offered to the Airport Operators by the Central Government and the other agreements which form an integral and inalienable part of such concession.
		Reading of Section 13(1)(a)(vi) indicates that the concession granted by the Central Government has to be read into the AERA Act and all its provisions as well as limitations contained therein have to be considered by AERA while determining tariff including while deciding which services in a particular case and in terms of the relevant Concession, can be regulated by AERA.
		This is further confirmed by a reading of the proviso to Section 13(1)(a) of the AERA Act which states that "different tariff structures may be determined for different airports having regard to all or any of the considerations specified at sub-clauses (i) to(vii)" in the said section. In other words, the AERA Act recognizes that a straightjacket applicability of its provisions to all major airports is not intended and grants flexibility to AERA to determine tariff structures to different airports having regard to various considerations including the concession granted by the Central Government.
		Thus, even though the AERA Act empowers AERA to regulate tariff for Aeronautical Service as defined in Section 2(a) of the AERA Act, in case any concession has already been granted by the Central Government, AERA is statutorily mandated to consider such concession.
		In the case of RGIA, since one of the concession granted by the Central Government is that save for the 'Regulated Charges', the GHIAL shall be free without any restriction to determine all Other

Subject	IATA's Comments	GHIAL response
		Charges. Thus, on a reading of Section 13(1)(a)(vi) of
		the AERA Act read with Article 10.2 and 10.3 of the
		Concession Agreement, AERA is only empowered to
		regulate the Regulated Charges as defined in the
		Concession Agreement (as an exception to the
		mandate of the Act which is recognized and allowed
		by the Act itself) and cannot regulate any Other
		Charges in respect of the facilities and services
		provided at the Airport including the other
		Aeronautical Services as defined in Section 2(a) of the
		AERA Act.
		As such Authority is not mandated to regulate any
		Other Charges in respect of the facilities and services
		provided at the Airport.
		This clarifies that Cargo, Ground Handling and Fuel
	·	services should be kept outside the regulation.
		GoAP:
		GoAP also has clarified that Cargo, Ground Handling
		and Fuel should not be regulated. GHIAL has
		accordingly classified Cargo assets as non-aero and
		revenue from Cargo, Ground Handling and Fuel
		services has been classified as non-aero. In our view
		this is what is contemplated under the Concession
		Agreement and the same is requested to be accepted
4) Pre-	AERA was established by the Indian	by the Authority. There is no bar on the Authority considering the
ontrol	Government through notification no GSR 317	eligible entitlement of previous periods for finalizing
eriod	(E) dated 12 May 2009. Prior to the	the tariff of current period.
osses	establishment of AERA, the Ministry of Civil	
	Aviation was the de facto economic regulator.	The Authority is mandated to consider the concession
	1ATA is of the strong view that legally, the	agreements and as part of this role, will need to
	Authority does not have jurisdiction over the	consider past losses in the computation of the tariffs
	period prior to its establishment and especially	post creation of AERA. There needs to be fairness in
	since there was a separate entity performing	the process such that the Capex and opex spent by
	the regulator's role at that time i.e. the	airport operator is properly remunerated. In the
	Ministry. In assessing the pre-control period	absence of this there cannot be any investment by
	claim, the period between 23 April 2008 and	the private sector under PPP.
	May 2009 (the establishment of AERA) should	
	be excluded. Therefore, the Authority's	

Subject	IATA's Comments	GHIAL response
	proposed pre-control period losses (Rs260.68 crores under single till and Rs447.14 crores	was undertaken by Authority after its constitution.
	under dual till) should be re-computed.	The same was finalized after detailed public
		consultation under the AERA act. In the earlier tariff
		order, Authority has laid down the following:
		"The detailed comments of the Authority on the issues raised by HIAL (as indicated in para 18.1 above) are given in Annexure-II. Broadly, it is the Authority's understanding that the aforesaid differences are arising mainly as HIAL is taking 2010-11 estimates as firm figures. It is reiterated that the figures of 2010-11 are only estimates and therefore, Authority proposes to continue with its approach of taking octuals of 2009-10 to estimate the figures in respect of 2010-11 and 2011-12 and 201213.
		After reconciliation the UDF rate has been worked out os Rs-430/-per domestic passenger and Rs.1700/-per international passenger, exclusive of service tax, on an ad- hoc basis w.e.f, 01.11.2010 (details at Annexure III).
		Authority is conscious that on a detailed ossessment, including bottoms up analysis of all revenues and expenditures, the UDF rates presently determined may need to be altered. This exercise will be undertaken ot the final determination stage."
		Accordingly this is in continuation of the earlier order of the Authority.
(5) Asset Allocation (Aeronautic al / Non-	• It is noted that asset allocation only emerges as an issue if dual till is applied. The Authority had recognized the need for an independent assessment of asset allocation in early 2012	The allocation was done on a scientific method and details and necessary certificates thereof have been submitted to the Authority.
Aeronautica	during the tariff determination process for	The asset allocation suggested by IATA is very

Subject	IATA's Comments	GHIAL response
1)	Indira Gandhi International Airport, Delhi but had not taken any action between then and this instance of tariff determination for Rajiv Gandhi International Airport. The absence of an independent study has left this issue in a non- ideal situation of having to rely on the airport's allocation formula and to endure an unverified allocation formula until the next control period. In the event that a decision to adopt dual till is taken, IATA does not support the unverified use of the airport's allocation formula but instead requests the Authority to adopt a nominal asset allocation percentage of 70% to the aeronautical category which is in line with the experience seen at a number of European airports (please see Appendix 1).	unscientific and vague method. As regards to adoption of European methodology, we need to keep in mind that no two airports are similar in nature. GHIAL has concessioned out most of its non-aero revenue streams and as such it will have low Non Aero assets in its books. Proposal 3. a (ii) of the Consultation Paper No. 09/2013-14 stated the following "The Authority also tentatively proposes that it will commission an independent study to assess the reasonableness of the asset allocation submitted by HIAL and would take corrective action, as may be necessary for determination of tariffs under dual till, at the commencement of the next control period commencing with effect from 01.04.2016. The Authority further proposes that upon analysis / examination pursuant to such a study, the Authority may conclude that the allocation of assets considered under dual till needs to be changed. In such a case the Authority would consider truing up the allocation mix at the commencement of the next control period as may be relevant."
		As the Authority proposes to commission an independent study hence concern of IATA is no more valid.
(6) Future Capital Expendíture	 IATA agrees with the Authority's proposal given that: The costs submitted by the airport operator are only broad estimates Capital expenditure taken on by a separate entity should not in normal circumstances be included for tariff determination of the airport entity 	The details submitted to the Authority are comprehensive to enable allowance of future Capex. Sufficient evidences have been produced in support of the fact that no user consultation is required for such Capex. The stand of allowing Capex at a future date makes the approval uncertain and will lead to inefficient
(7) General	Admission of the General Capital Expenditure	operations at airport which may impact the quality of

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Subject	IATA's Comments	GHIAL response
Capital Expenditure	proposed by the airport in the Regulatory Asset Base for tariff determination in the current control period would necessitate that the estimated costs quoted are realistic and the eventual actual costs would not vary significantly from these estimates. To ensure proper cost control measures are practiced by the airport, there should be a cap on the upward variation of the costs allowable for truing up (e.g. up to 5%) notwithstanding that evidential submissions along with auditor	services at the airport. The stand of future approval also makes it difficult for the airport to borrow for such projects. Since a 100% true up will be there for the future Capex it is earnest requested that the Future Capex should be allowed to be part of current approval. In absence of this the quality of the airport will suffer tremendously.
(8) Treatment of land granted by the State Government	certificates are required. • IATA agrees that land provided by the State for the airport project should result in benefits to the industry by way of lowering the cost environment at the airport which would in turn support aviation growth and drive economic growth within the state. IATA fully supports the Authority's proposal to bring such intended benefits to the fore through a fair mechanism such as one that reduces the RAB by the market value of the land.	The stand of IATA is misplaced to the extent that the entire land was not meant for airport as clarified by GoAP, the entity which gave land to GHIAL. A conjoint reading Concession Agreement, State Support Agreement and the Land lease Agreement indicates that the following concessions and assurances have been granted to the GHIAL at the time of the grant of the right/concession to develop the Airport, namely: The Concession Agreement defines and differentiates between mandatory 'Airport Activities" consisting of aeronautical as well as non-aeronautical activities at the Airport and non-mandatory 'Non-Airport Activities' which the GHIAL is entitled to undertake at the Land (as defined under the Land Lease Agreement). Thus, in addition to the rights granted to the GHIAL for setting up and operating the RGIA, certain additional rights have been granted for the purpose of development of the additional land for purely commercial purposes not relating to the airport activity. In this regard, as noticed hereinabove, the Concession Agreement also makes a distinction between "Airport Activities" and Non-Airport Activities". While Airport Activities has been defined under Article 1.1 of the Concession Agreement to mean "the provision, at or in relation to the Airport, of the activities set out at Schedule 3, Part 1 as amended from time to time, pursuant to ICAO

Subject	IATA's Comments	GHIAL response
		guidelines, provided that any activities that are not materially similar to those contemplated in Schedule 3, Part 1 shall require the mutual agreement of the Parties", Non-Airport Activities means "the provision, at or in relation to the Airport, of the services set out at Schedule 3, Part 2".
		Schedule 3, Part 2 of the Concession Agreement provides for the Non-Airport activities which consist of real estate activities. These activities are totally unconnected with the Airport Activities.
		In view of the above, it is pertinent to note that the land earmarked for development of Non-Airport Activities as well as the cost of setting up and carrying out the Non-Airport Activities is not to be considered for the purpose of arriving at 'total project costs' of the Airport. GHIAL is permitted to utilize the said land parcel out of the total Land for carrying out Non- Airport Activities which are purely commercial, real estate and totally unconnected with the Airport business.
		On a conjoint reading of Section 13(1)(a)(vi) of the AERA Act read with Article 10.2 and 10.3 of the Concession Agreement mandates regulating the Regulated Charges as defined in the Concession Agreement and not regulate any Other Charges in respect of the facilities and services provided at the Airport nor using the revenue therefrom to subsidize the Aero Charges.
		The value of the land earmarked for Non-Airport Activities (market or notional) cannot be included in nor deducted from the RAB and accordingly the revenue generated therefrom cannot be taken into account for cross subsidizing aeronautical tariff at airport.

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Subject	IATA's Comments	GHIAL response
(9)	• IATA agrees with the Authority's proposal.	The sourcing of funds at a lower rate in foreign
Treatment	Variations in foreign exchange can result in	exchange is for the benefit to the passenger / other
of foreign	gains or losses which should be absorbed by	stakeholders by way of a lower WACC.
exchange fluctuations	the business entity as part of the risks of conducting business.	However this means of funding also carries the inherent risk of foreign exchange fluctuations. Taking the benefit of a lower interest rate but not allowing the resultant Forex fluctuation goes against the principles of natural justice.
		 The fluctuation need to be incorporated as part of RAB because of following reasons: (1) The level of Forex borrowing is not excessive. The level of borrowing is at level generally accepted to be normal in the industry. (2) This borrowing was availed before the Authority's current stand was finalized. The borrowing structure cannot be amended now.
		The Authority should appreciate the fact that the Company has not retained the benefits of cheaper borrowing cost and is passed on to the passenger in the form of lower WACC.
		If the Company had taken Domestic Loan instead of the ECB equivalent amount, the outflows of cash towards interest costs would have been much more. Also, it should be noted that the loss of Forex fluctuation on interest payments & principal repayments is real in nature and not a notional loss.
		GHIAL has taken the hit of the Forex fluctuations in actuals of FY 2011-12 and FY 2012-13 owing to interest and repayments servicing the ECB loan to the extent of Rs 34.46 Crs. This loss is not included in the computations of WACC.
		Therefore, Authority is requested to allow the Loss on impact of Forex Fluctuations by Inclusion of same in RAB.

Subject	IATA/s Comments	CHIAI response
Subject	IATA's Comments	GHIAL response
(10) Cost of	• IATA views that the cost of equity of 13.2%	The stand of IATA defies logic.
equity	calculated by NIPFP is a reasonable reflection of	The bank barrens is a mater bains around 110/ to 120/
	HIAL's cost of equity and disagrees with the	The bank borrowing rates being around 11% to 12%
	Authority's tentative proposal to round the	and inflation being in rage of 10-11% there is no way equity return of 13.2% can be justified
1	figure up to 16%. IATA believes that there is no need for rounding up and the value of 13.2%	equity return of 15.2% can be justified
	should be used as it is. This value of 13.2%	The minimum equity IRR of 18.33% was promised
	should also be used for computation of HIAL's	under the GO No.130 dated July 26, 2013 issued by
	WACC as well as for assessment of pre-control	GOAP
	period losses from September 2009 to March	
	2011.	The State Support Agreement is integral to the
		concession itself being a fundamental premise of the
		said concession and cannot be read in isolation or
		disregarded/ varied once the Parties to the
		concession have recognized, accepted and acted on
		the same. In view of the above, the Authority is
		requested not to alter or vary the assurance of
		minimum 18.33% Equity IRR (which is equivalent to
		24% return on equity) granted to GHIAL.
		Also the following are results of some of the studies
		carried out by various experts on cost of equity.
		These are very established organizations of national
		and international repute. These studies were carried
		out on behalf of the Airports, the industry
		associations as well as MoCA, GOI. However the
		report of NIPFP relied by Authority have no such
		experience. The resultant number of NIPFP is
		nowhere near the estimates of these reports.
		Cost of Equity
		Jacobs 24% KPMG (for APAO) 20%-25%
		based on debt equity ratio.
		SBI Caps (For MoCA/AAI) 18.5% to 20.5%
		CRISIL (For MIAL) 18.16 to 20.44%
		based on debt equity ratio.
		NIPFP 13.2%
		Another interesting aspect is that with Cost of GHAIL
		debt being around 12% the Cost of equity of 13.2% is
		very low. NIPFP report was flawed and needed a lot
1		of corrections. Authority has accepted a return of
		16% against 13.2% recommended by NIPFP. This goes

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Rajiv Gandhi International Airport, Shamshabad, Hyderabad Response to Comments of IATA

Subject	IATA's Comments	GHIAL response
		on to show that the study has not been found to be fully acceptable by the Authority as well. As such without prejudice to our stand that the minimum equity IRR should be 18.33% (equivalent to cost of equity of 24%) it is earnestly requested that a cost of equity based on various other studies as enumerated above may be used for tariff determination of GHIAL. Since the report of SBI Caps was by the GoI which is an independent entity, and the study was for private airports, the equity return as given in that report may be considered by Authority. Considering the higher Debt Equity ratio of GHIAL the higher range of the said report i.e. 20.5% is the minimum that may kindly be approved.
(11) Operating Expenses	• IATA disagrees that a real increase of 3% over and above the current inflation of 6.5% provides a reasonable incentive for the airport operator to improve operating efficiency. The average used by the Authority to derive the 3% figure is flawed as three data points is far too few to provide a reliable and accurate average.	GHIAL had asked for a real increase much higher than proposed by Authority. The increase currently proposed by Authority is very miniscule and GHIAL will not be able to carry out operations efficiently with such meager increase.
	Also, using data for the first three years of the airport's operations to represent that of future years is not reasonable as the nature of costs at start-up is unlikely to be the same as the steady-state costs.	The increase proposed by the Authority in consultation paper takes away the incentive to airport operator for the good work done of containing costs in past.
	• IATA notes that as a result of the assumptions used by the Authority to grant a 3% real increase, it has unfairly provided an operating expense budget that is even higher than what the airport had asked for. This should be	Also the additional quality parameters imposed by the Authority will entail additional expenditure. The same also need to be taken into account while approving the operating expenditure.
	reviewed especially given that the airport's proposal would have more likely than not already built in some buffer.	Hence, the Authority is requested to consider the growth rates as submitted by GHIAL.
	• IATA also notes that the 3% real increase have been approved across the board, even for irregular or ad hoc expense categories such as "Consultancy" and "Other Miscellaneous Business Promotion" that do not necessarily	With reference to the increase GHIAL had made its submissions without considering WPI growth and requesting AERA to consider the same during the final tariff determination.
	increase over time. This has resulted in provision of budget that is more than necessary for the airport and has led to additional buffer that does not incentivize operational efficiency.	Authority also needs to note that the operating expenses rise sharply as the facility gets older. Mere inflationary increase cannot sustain operations.

Subject	IATA's Comments	GHIAL response
	• IATA would propose that in order to provide a reasonable challenge for the airport to push for operational efficiency, the allowable annual increase in operating expenses needs to be below the inflation rate which is currently at 6.5%.	
(12) Treatment of Cargo Revenue	 IATA is concerned that while the assets used for provision of cargo services are in the books of the airport thus requiring the users to shoulder the burden of depreciation and WACC payable to the airport, the revenue that goes back to the airport to be treated as aeronautical revenue (which is a minor portion of the amount earned by the concessionaire) may not be commensurate with the costs borne by the users. Furthermore, the users could already be paying to the concessionaire (Hyderabad Menzies Air Cargo Pvt Ltd) cargo rates that are far in excess of the returns that the airport is entitled to should it be handling the cargo services itself. In other words, the users could be hit with a double whammy. IATA urges the Authority to re-examine the situation thoroughly and in conjunction with the returns that HMACPL is getting to ensure that users do not end up shouldering unnecessary high costs for cargo services. 	As explained above in detail, we are of the view that cargo should be outside regulation and all Capex and the revenue associated therein should be treated as Non Aero. This includes the revenue share as well as the rentals. Cargo must be kept outside the regulations. Cargo must be kept outside the regulations. Section 13(1)(a)(vi) of the AERA Act read with Article 10.2 and 10.3 of the Concession Agreement mandates regulating the Regulated Charges as defined in the Concession Agreement. AERA act contemplates that the concession needs to be taken into consideration in fixing the charge. The clause 13(1)(a)(iv) reads as under: CHAPTERIN Powers and Planctors of the Armourry 13.(i) The Authority shall perform the following functions in respect of regional protocol (a) to determine the welf for the semantical services taking into consideration- (i) the capital expenditure incurred and timely investment in improvement of almost facilities;
a a		 (ii) the service provided, its quality and other relevant factors; (iii) the cost for improving efficiency; (iv) economic and viable operation of major airports; (v) revenue received from services other than the momantical services; (vf) the concession offered by the Central Government in any agreement or memorandum of understanding or otherwise; The Concession Agreement contemplates regulations of only the Regulated Charges by the Authority as mentioned in the Schedule 6 of Concession Agreement. The AERA act also contemplated that the concession should be adhered. As such the provisions of the concession agreement needs to be adhered. Provisions of Concession Agreement:
		Only the following Regulated Charges as enumerated

IATA's Comments

Subject

and contract of	
	in the Schedule 6 of the Concession Agreement are to
	be regulated by the Independent Regulatory
	Authority (IRA):
	1. Landing Charges
	2. Parking Charges
	3. Housing Charges
	4. Passenger Service
	Fee
	5. User Development
	Fee Clause 10.2 of the Concession Agreement reads as
	under:
	10.2 Airport Charges
	TOT All hole of diges
	10.2.4 From the date the IRA has the power
	to approve the Regulated Charges, HIAL shall
	be required to obtain approval thereof from
	the IRA. In this regard HIAL shall submit to
	the IRA, in accordance with any regulations
	framed by the IRA, details of the Regulated
	Charges proposed to be imposed for the
	next succeeding relevant period together
	with such information as the IRA may
	require for review
	iii. Freedom to determine Other Charges for other
	facilities or services:
	Clause 10.3 of the Concession Agreement reads as
	follows:
	10.3 Other Charges
	HIAL and/or Service Provider Right Holders
	shall be free without any restriction to
	determine the charges to be imposed in
	respect of the facilities and services provided
	at the Airport or on the Site, other than the
	facilities and services in respect of which
	achieves and services in respect of which

CP 09/2013-14 (01.04.2011 – 31.03.2016) Determination of Aeronautical Tariff of Rajlv Gandhi International Airport, Shamshabad, Hyderabad

GHIAL response

Subject	IATA's Comments	GHIAL response
		Regulated Charges are levied.
		As such Authority is not mandated to regulate any Other Charges in respect of the facilities and services provided at the Airport. As such the Cargo should be outside the regulations.
(13) Treatment of Ground Handling Revenue	• Under the AERA Act, ground handling service is an aeronautical service. Regardless of who provides the service, the airport has the monopoly power to affect the cost which is a significant component of industry cost. In order to curb any monopolistic tendency of the airport to treat ground handling services as a convenient source of revenue which could then lead to runaway cost for the airlines and the industry, IATA asserts that revenue in any form (including royalties and concession revenue) derived by the airport from ground handling services should be treated as aeronautical revenue.	As explained above in detail, we are of the view that ground handling should be outside the regulation.
(14) Fuel throughput charge	• IATA is of the strong view that the sanctity of the tariff determination process should not be compromised by allowing the airport to levy a fuel throughput charge that is 2.6 times higher than what is allowed based on the ARR. AERA must preserve an orderly process by only allowing the ARR for fuel services to be collected through the fuel throughput charge and not allow a huge over-collection above the ARR to take place on the weak justification that it would be compensated through a lower YPP. It is unfair and indefensible to have the airlines pay a much higher rate just because they had been grossly over- charged all along. IATA also disagrees with the Authority's observation that the fuel farm agreements had been reasonable because the Authority was not aware of reasonable objections from the users of fuel farm services. The airlines had all along vehemently objected to the high fuel throughput charge at HYD but had no recourse	In the current tariff filing the upsides of fuel are being utilized for reduction of aeronautical charges. GHIAL is recovering as per entitled target revenue based on building blocks approach. However we are of the view that Fuel Charges should be outside regulation.
	since the airport had absolute monopoly over fuel services. IATA urges AERA to redress this unfair situation and reduce the fuel throughput 3-14 (01.04.2011 – 31.03.2016)	

Subject	IATA's Comments	GHIAL response
	charge to what is permissible based on ARR i.e. at Rs 828.29 per kiloliter.	
(15) Tariff Structure / Rate Card	 IATA is strongly opposed to the 100% increase in landing fee for international flights as that would present a significant shock to airlines' operating costs. IATA urges a significantly more moderate increase, if need be, that will support a cost environment more conducive for airlines to operate in and be able to grow services. From international experience, a 10% increase in landing fee would already be considered as at the high end. IATA reiterates its rejection of a differential in 	Even with the proposed increase the landing and parking charges at GHIAL will be lower than those at Chennai and Kolkata. As regards to the issues of differentiation of rates in domestic and international passengers are concerned, we state that MoCA did the fixation of rates of the original DF. The current rates have also being determined by AERA.
	anding fee between international and domestic flights as this is in gross contravention of CAO principles and a highly unfair situation to pave one airline subsidizing another airline for	The differentiation in rates is a worldwide phenomenon and almost all airports in world particularly the European and Australian airports have a differential pricing amongst domestic and international passengers because of the differentiation in service and time spent at airport.
 the same usage of facilities on account of the flights' origins. IATA notes that the ratio of UDF between domestic to international has been kept the same as the existing rate of 1:3.95. IATA believes that this ratio is unfair. 1ATA urges the use of a more equitable ratio of 1:2 or lower. IATA believes that as with the proposal by AERA in the tariff determination consultation paper for BLR, the Common Infrastructure Charge proposed for HYD should be disallowed for the sake of rate card simplicity and the revenue requirement be merged into the UDF. As per the comments in point (14), the fuel throughput charge should be set at the correct level of Rs 828.29 per kiloliter. IATA agrees with AERA's rejection of charging UDF for arriving passengers. 	Also worthwhile is to mention that there has not been any major increase in landing and parking charges in almost last 10 years (except for a 105 increase in 2009) and even if we go by inflationary increase the current increase is justified. Passing on the entire burden on passenger charges is not	
	AERA in the tariff determination consultation paper for BLR, the Common Infrastructure Charge proposed for HYD should be disallowed for the sake of rate card simplicity and the revenue requirement be merged into the UDF.	justified.
	throughput charge should be set at the correct level of Rs 828.29 per kiloliter.IATA agrees with AERA's rejection of charging	

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(16) Regulatory	• IATA is fully supportive of AERA's proposal to determine aeronautical tariffs at RGI	The concession agreement as well as the AERA act supports the Dual Till at GHIAL. Following is the basis
till	Airport, Hyderabad under single till. AERA had arrived at its conclusion after having gone	of the same:
	through a comprehensive study and extensive consultation that the most	A conjoint reading of the concession documents, indicates that the following concessions and
	appropriate approach in the context of India that best protects the interests of passengers	assurances (relevant for the present queries) have been granted at the time of the grant of the
	is the single till approach and this should be used for regulation of tariffs at HYD.	right/concession to develop the Airport, namely:
		(i) Under Clause 10.2 read with Schedule 6 of the
		Concession Agreement, only Airport Charges defined as the 'Regulated Charges' are to be regulated by the IRA (i.e. AERA).

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 (ii) Under Clause 10.2.4 of the Concession Agreement, the Regulated Charges shall be approved in consonance with ICAO Policies until the earlier of (i) the date that outstanding Debt in respect of the Initial Phase has been repaid and (ii) fifteen (15) years from the Airport Opening Date.
(iii) In view of Clause 10.3 of the Concession Agreement, the GHIAL shall "be free without any restriction" to determine all Other Charges which are levied in respect of all other facilities and services at ' the Airport.
(iv) The Concession Agreement defines and differentiates between mandatory 'Airport Activities" consisting of aeronautical as well as non-aeronautical activities at the Airport and non-mandatory 'Non- Airport Activities' which GHAIL is entitled to undertake at the Land (as defined under the Land Lease Agreement).
 The Concession Agreement (in terms of Article 10.2 and 10.3) has classified only two types of charges at RGIA i.e. Regulated Charges and Other Charges for the Airport Activities carried out at the Airport by the GHIAL consisting of both aeronautical as well as non- aeronautical activities. The Concession Agreement also defines "Regulated Charges" under Article 10.2.1 to mean only such Airport Charges as specified in Schedule 6 of the Concession Agreement and thus in terms of Schedule 6, Regulated Charges means the following charges i.e. (i) Landing Housing and Parking charges, (ii) Passenger Service Fee and (iii) User Development Fee.
2. While Article 10.2 read with Schedule 6 of the Concession Agreement mandates that the IRA i.e. AERA (pursuant to being empowered for the purpose) shall approve/determine the Regulated Charges, Article 10.3 states unequivocally that except the Regulated Charges mentioned in Schedule 6, the GHIAL shall "be free without any restriction" to determine all Other Charges which are levied in

respect of the activities defined as the Airport Activities at the Airport. Other Charges have been defined in Article 10.3 to include all facilities and services provided at the Airport except facilities and services in respect of which Regulated Charges are levied. In other words, the Concession Agreement provides that while AERA shall be empowered to regulate all Regulated Charges mentioned in Schedule 6, the power to determine all charges other than Regulated Charges rests with the GHIAL.
3. Thus, the Concession Agreement makes a clear distinction between charges which require determination by AERA [i.e. Airport Charges (which are Regulated Charges) and those which can be fixed by the GHIAL itself i.e. Other Charges (which are also Airport Charges but are not subject to regulation by AERA).
4. It is pertinent to note that Section 13 of the AERA Act which empowers AERA to determine the tariff of "aeronautical services" in respect of major airports mandates AERA to take various factors into consideration for determining the tariff. A perusal of Section 13 of the AERA Act makes it clear that while determining tariff for aeronautical services, AERA is statutorily obligated to consider the concession offered to the Airport Operators by the Central Government and the other agreements which form an integral and inalienable part of such concession.
Reading of Section 13(1)(a)(vi) indicates that the concession granted by the Central Government has to be read into the AERA Act and all its provisions as well as limitations contained therein have to be considered by AERA while determining tariff including while deciding which services in a particular case and in terms of the relevant Concession, can be regulated by AERA.
This is further confirmed by a reading of the proviso to Section 13(1)(a) of the AERA Act which states that "different tariff structures may be determined for different airports having regard to all or any of the considerations specified at sub-clauses (i) to(vii)" in

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the said section. In other words, the AERA Act recognizes that a straightjacket applicability of its provisions to all major airports is not intended and grants flexibility to AERA to determine tariff structures to different airports having regard to various considerations including the concession granted by the Central Government.
5. Thus, even though the AERA Act empowers AERA to regulate tariff for Aeronautical Service as defined in Section 2(a) of the AERA Act, in case any concession has already been granted by the Central Government, AERA is statutorily mandated to consider such concession.
In the case of RGIA, since one of the concession granted by the Central Government is that save for the 'Regulated Charges', the GHIAL shall be free without any restriction to determine all Other Charges. Thus, on a reading of Section 13(1)(a)(vi) of the AERA Act read with Article 10.2 and 10.3 of the Concession Agreement, AERA is only empowered to regulate the Regulated Charges as defined in the Concession Agreement (as an exception to the mandate of the Act which is recognized and allowed by the Act itself) and cannot regulate any Other Charges in respect of the facilities and services provided at the Airport including the other Aeronautical Services as defined in Section 2(a) of the AERA Act.
By adopting a single till AERA is limiting the return which can accrue to airport operator on Non Aeronautical part or on unregulated charges. This is an indirect regulation of activities not mandated under AERA act or concession agreement.

(17) Quality	• IATA agrees with the proposal for the	In terms of the AERA Act it is earnestly submitted that
of Services	rebate mechanism and the proposal for a	the role and jurisdiction of the Authority is limited to
	transition period of six months for	monitoring compliance of the service quality
	implementation but implementation should	standards prescribed under the concession
	take place no later than 1 April 2014.	agreement. The prescription of any new services
		standards is not envisaged.
		While Section 13(1)(a)(ii) of the AERA Act permits the
		Authority to consider the services provided, its quality
		and other relevant factors in determining the tariff,
		there is no explicit power vested with the Authority to
		prescribe any penalties under the AERA Act in the
		event of a failure to meet service quality
		requirements.
		In view of the Authority being required to take the
		terms of the concession agreement into consideration
		for determining tariff and in view of the concession
		agreement already providing for a mechanism for
		penalties for failure to achieve service quality
		requirements, the Authority should not only take into
		consideration the service quality requirements, but
		also the penalties for failure to meet service quality
		requirements as set forth therein. Any penalties
		prescribed by the Authority for failure to meet the said
		service quality requirements would effectively
		tantamount to the Authority not taking into
		consideration the terms (including penalties) of the
		Concession Agreements and therefore would not be
		consistent with the AERA Act
		Therefore, Authority is requested not to impose
		additional standards and penalties over and above
		those enumerated in the CA. Additional quality
		parameters, maintaining these standards, and
		monitoring requires additional capital and operating
		expenditure. The same needs to be allowed over and
		above the amounts allowed by Authority. As such the
		Authority is requested to continue with the
		methodology as prescribed under Concession Agreements for compliance, monitoring and penalties
		for non-conformity.
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Rajiv Gandhi International Airport, Shamshabad, Hyderabad Response to Comments of IOCL, BPCL and HPCL

Comments of IOCI, ppcl, and lipci	CHIAL D
Comments of IOCL, BPCL and HPCL	GHIAL Response
a) As mentioned in clause 17.24 of the Consultation Paper,	We disagree with the stand of oil companies that the
we agree with the Authority that tariff for service of supply	fuel charges must be regulated.
of fuel has to be determined by the Authority under AERA Act.	Section 13(1)(a)(vi) of the AERA Act read with Article
Act.	10.2 and 10.3 of the Concession Agreement mandates
b) With regard to paras 17.25 and 17.29 of the Consultation	regulating the Regulated Charges as defined in the
Paper, we would like to submit, that the Oil companies, as	Concession Agreement.
Suppliers at the airport, are the users of the fuel farm	
services and have entered into individual tri-partite	Section 13 of the AERA Act states as under:
Suppliers Agreements with the fuel farm service provider	
i.e. GHIAL as Airport Operator and M/S Reliance Industries	"13. Functions of authority- (1) The Authority shall
Ltd. as Fuel Farm Operator. The tariff for use of fuel	perform the following functions in respect of major
facilities at the airport was not indicated in the Suppliers	airports, namely:-
Agreement, however the same was mentioned in an e-mail	(a) to determine the tariff for the aeronautical services
message dated e Feb, 2008 from GHIAL, as Rs. 2170 per KL (Rs. 670 per KL towards Throughput Fee plus Rs.1500 per KL	taking into consideration-
towards Infrastructure Recovery Charge, which includes fee	(i) the capital expenditure incurred and timely
towards Into Plane services). Copy of the e-mail is attached	investment in improvement of airport facilities;
as Annexure-I.	(ii) the service provided, its quality and other
	relevant factors;
	(iii) the cost for improving efficiency;
	airports; (v) revenue received from services other than
	aeronautical services
	(v) revenue received from services other than the
	aeronautical services;
	(vi) the concession offered by the Central Government
	in any agreement or memorandum of understanding or
	otherwise;
	(vii) any other factor which may be relevant for the
	purposes of this Act:
	Provided that different tariff structures may be
	determined for different airports having regard to all or
	any of the above considerations specified at sub-
	clauses (i) to (vii)" (emphasis added)
	A perusal of Section 13 of the AERA Act makes it clear
	that while determining tariff for aeronautical services,
	AERA is statutorily obligated to consider the concession
	offered to the Airport Operators by the Central
	oncrea to the Anport Operators by the Central

Rajiv Gandhi International Airport, Shamshabad, Hyderabad Response to Comments of IOCL, BPCL and HPCL

Comments of IOCL, BPCL and HPCL	GHIAL Response
	Government and the other agreements which form an
	integral and inalienable part of such concession.
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	Reading of Section 13(1)(a)(vi) indicates that the
	concession granted by the Central Government has to
	be read into the AERA Act and all its provisions as well
	as limitations contained therein have to be considered
	by AERA while determining tariff including while
	deciding which services in a particular case and in terms
	of the relevant Concession, can be regulated by AERA.
	This is further confirmed by a reading of the proviso to
	Section 13(1)(a) of the AERA Act which states that
	"different tariff structures may be determined for
	different airports having regard to all or any of the
	considerations specified at sub-clauses (i) to(vii)" in the
	said section. In other words, the AERA Act recognizes
	that a straightjacket applicability of its provisions to all
	major airports is not intended and grants flexibility to AERA to determine tariff structures to different airports
	having regard to various considerations including the
	concession granted by the Central Government.
	concession granted by the central dovernment.
	Thus, even though the AERA Act empowers AERA to
	regulate tariff for Aeronautical Service as defined in
	Section 2(a) of the AERA Act, in case any concession has
	already been granted by the Central Government, AERA
	is statutorily mandated to consider such concession.
	In the case of RGIA, since one of the concession granted
	by the Central Government is that save for the
	'Regulated Charges', the GHIAL shall be free without
	any restriction to determine all Other Charges. Thus, on
	a reading of Section 13(1)(a)(vi) of the AERA Act read
	with Article 10.2 and 10.3 of the Concession
	Agreement, AERA is only empowered to regulate the
	Regulated Charges as defined in the Concession
	Agreement (as an exception to the mandate of the Act

Rajiv Gandhi International Airport, Shamshabad, Hyderabad Response to Comments of IOCL, BPCL and HPCL

Comments of IOCL, BPCL and HPCLGHIAL Responsewhich is recognized and allowed by the Act its cannot regulate any Other Charges in respect of facilities and services provided at the Airport i the other Aeronautical Services as defined in S 2(a) of the AERA Act.(a) of the AERA Act.As such Authority is not mandated to regulate Other Charges in respect of the facilities and se provided at the Airport.(c) The Fuel Throughput charges of Rs. 2170 per KL demanded by GHIAL was considered exorbitant and the Oil PSUs had jointly protested against the same, vide communication ref. AV/SSBJGHIAL dated 11. July, 2008. A copy of the joint letter protesting against such exorbitant rate demanded by GHIAL is attached as Annexure-II.The rates proposed by GHIAL were accepted b to infrastructure charge.GHIAL did not have any reasonable consultation, stakeholder meeting or discussion for exchange of views with Suppliers or any back ground of such over-priced Fuel Throughput Charge. However, with no other alternative, and in order to ensure supplies to honour contractual commitments to Airline customers, the Suppliers had no option but to accept the tariff demanded by GHIAL at these rates.There was no coercion of any type with oil cor It is ridiculous to assume any coercion with the monopolistic public sector oil companies.As you may kindly be aware, the "Throughput Fee' & "Infrastructure & Opex Fee' charged to the Suppliers gets"Also be crutinized by AERA as it is the and in order to ensure supplies to GHIAL at these rates.As you may kindly be aware, the "Throughput Fee' & "Infrastructure & Opex Fee' charged to the Suppliers gets"Also be crutinized by AERA as it is the and in companies at its to the suppliers or anot the suppliers or any back ground for the	
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	ultimate
added to final ATF price for Airlines, thereby increasing the input cost to Airline Operations.cost of fuel that is important to airlines and ex profits should not be allowed to monopolistic companies.	
Without prejudice to our rights, AERA has con- fuel throughput charges as aeronautical reven consultation paper. As per building block appr GHIAL is entitled to get aero-nautical revenue the building blocks. So irrespective of the char towards Fuel, total entitlement of GHIAL rema same.	nue in the roach, as per rges

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Rajiv Gandhi International Airport, Shamshabad, Hyderabad Response to Comments of IOCL, BPCL and HPCL

Comments of IOCL, BPCL and HPCL	GHIAL Response
	Also as per the concession agreement the fuel charges are not to be regulated by the Authority.
	Under Section 13(1)(a)(vi) of the AERA Act read with Article 10.2 and 10.3 of the Concession Agreement mandates regulating the Regulated Charges as defined in the Concession Agreement.
	Section 13 of the AERA Act states as under:
	 "13. Functions of authority- (1) The Authority shall perform the following functions in respect of major airports, namely:- (a) to determine the tariff for the aeronautical services
	taking into consideration- (i) the capital expenditure incurred and timely
	investment in improvement of airport facilities;(ii) the service provided, its quality and other
	relevant factors; (iii) the cost for improving efficiency; (iv) economic and viable operation of major
	airports; (v) revenue received from services other than aeronautical services
	 (v) revenue received from services other than the aeronautical services;
	 (vi) the concession offered by the Central Government in any agreement or memorandum of understanding or otherwise;
	(vii) any other factor which may be relevant for the purposes of this Act:
	Provided that different tariff structures may be determined for different airports having regard to all or
	any of the above considerations specified at sub- clauses (i) to (vii)" (emphasis added)
	A perusal of Section 13 of the AERA Act makes it clear that while determining tariff for aeronautical services, AERA is statutorily obligated to consider the concession
	offered to the Airport Operators by the Central Government and the other agreements which form an

Rajiv Gandhi International Airport, Shamshabad, Hyderabad Response to Comments of IOCL, BPCL and HPCL

Comments of IOCL, BPCL and HPCL	GHIAL Response
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	Reading of Section 13(1)(a)(vi) indicates that the
	concession granted by the Central Government has to
	be read into the AERA Act and all its provisions as well
	as limitations contained therein have to be considered
	by AERA while determining tariff including while
	deciding which services in a particular case and in terms
	of the relevant Concession, can be regulated by AERA.
	of the relevant concession, can be regulated by ActA.
	This is further confirmed by a reading of the proviso to
	Section 13(1)(a) of the AERA Act which states that
	"different tariff structures may be determined for
	different airports having regard to all or any of the
	considerations specified at sub-clauses (i) to(vii)" in the
	said section. In other words, the AERA Act recognizes
	that a straightjacket applicability of its provisions to all
	major airports is not intended and grants flexibility to
	AERA to determine tariff structures to different airports
	having regard to various considerations including the
	concession granted by the Central Government.
	Thus, even though the AERA Act empowers AERA to
	regulate tariff for Aeronautical Service as defined in
	Section 2(a) of the AERA Act, in case any concession has
	already been granted by the Central Government, AERA
	is statutorily mandated to consider such concession.
	In the case of RGIA, since one of the concession granted
	by the Central Government is that save for the
	'Regulated Charges', the GHIAL shall be free without
	any restriction to determine all Other Charges. Thus, on
	a reading of Section 13(1)(a)(vi) of the AERA Act read
	with Article 10.2 and 10.3 of the Concession
	Agreement, AERA is only empowered to regulate the
	Regulated Charges as defined in the Concession
	Agreement (as an exception to the mandate of the Act
	which is recognized and allowed by the Act itself) and
	cannot regulate any Other Charges in respect of the

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Comments of IOCL, BPCL and HPCL	GHIAL Response
	facilities and services provided at the Airport including
	the other Aeronautical Services as defined in Section
	2(a) of the AERA Act.
	As such Authority is not mandated to regulate any Other Charges in respect of the facilities and services provided at the Airport.
	Accordingly, it's an earnest request that the Fuel charges should be kept outside the regulations.
d) It may further be noted that in response to Authority's letter ref. F.No.AERA/20015/FT/2010-11/305 dated 24 th June 2010 addressed to GHIAL, the Oil PSU had, vide joint	The earlier charging also had considered the fuel charges @ 2170/- per KL.
letter dated 16 th July, 2010, advised GHIAL to arrange necessary approvals from AERA for the throughput charges demanded by GHIAL. Copy of the joint communication	The ad-hoc tariff approval was done vide order number 06/2010-11 dated 26th October 2010 for this period.
dated 16 th July, 2011 is placed at Annexure-III.	AERA approved Fuel throughput charges to continue at the prevailing rate till the order was valid or till the final order is passed, whichever is earlier.
	However we shall like to clarify that the fuel throughput charge is a profit sharing with oil companies and the same should not be passed on to airlines. Further as stated above oil companies also are supplying fuel to the airlines at airports and thus their profits (which are not transparent) and revenues should also be scrutinized by AERA as it is the ultimate cost of fuel that is important to airlines and excessive profits should not be allowed to monopolistic oil companies.
e) In view of the above fact, which is on record, and which information might not have been made available to the Authority, we are of the opinion that reasonable objection from users of the fuel farm facilities' do exist, and that the	The existing agreements including the rates being charged have been agreed upon by oil companies and the same has been paid by them.
tariffs for fuel farm services should therefore, not be determined under light touch approach and without consultation of Suppliers, which are the major stakeholders with regard to Fuel supplies at GHIAL.	AERA is taking a holistic view for the Airport as well as Fuel Farm and the excess revenue from Fuel Farm is being set off against the Airport's Revenue eligibility.
We would further like to submit that, the existing Supplier Agreement, between Suppliers, GHIAL and the Fuel Farm Operator, which was renewed on 31' August, 2011 for a	There is nothing on record to show that oil companies had communicated against the soft touch regulation.
period till 8°' March, 2014, clearly mentions that the Throughput Fee is required to be regulated by any appropriate authority as per the law, and that the regulated	The Para reproduced herein in no way can be interpreted to mean that the soft touch regulation cannot be there.

Determination of Aeronautical Tariff of Rajiv Gandhi International Airport, Shamshabad, Hyderabad

RaJiv Gandhi International Airport, Shamshabad, Hyderabad Response to Comments of IOCL, BPCL and HPCL

Comments of IOCL, BPCL and HPCL	GHIAL Response
fee that attains finality, shall prevail. During renewal of Supplier Agreement, discussions were held between Suppliers and GHIAL and Suppliers had clearly stated their position with respect to Authority's role regarding determination of tariff, thereby implying that the charges should not be considered under soft touch. Relevant clause of Supplier Agreements reproduced as under : The Throughput Fee plus taxes including service taxes and duties as applicable, levied on the Suppliers for each kiloliter of ATF delivered into the Aircraft 1it the Airport Shall be notified by GHIAL to the Suppliers from time to time. In case Throughput Fee is required to be regulated by any appropriate authority as per the law, the regulated fee that attains finality shall prevail. However, it is clarified that Throughput Fee shall be deemed to have attained finality only after settlement of all consultations contentions and/ or disputes, if any, between GHIAL and the regulator with regard to such regulated charges"	AERA has considered fuel throughput charges as aeronautical revenue in the consultation paper. As per building block approach, GHIAL is entitled to get aero- nautical revenue as per the building blocks. So irrespective of what GHIAL is charging towards Fuel total entitlement remains the same. However we are of the view that the fuel charges are akin to profit sharing with oil companies and should be treated as non-Aeronautical. We shall also like to clarify that the fuel throughput charge is a profit sharing with oil companies and the same should not be passed on to airlines as an airport charge. Further as stated above oil companies also are supplying fuel to the airlines at airports and thus their profits (which are not transparent) and revenues should also be scrutinized by AERA as it is the ultimate cost of fuel that is important to airlines and excessive profits should not be allowed to monopolistic oil companies. Also Section 13(1)(a)(vi) of the AERA Act read with Article 10.2 and 10.3 of the Concession Agreement mandates regulating the Regulated Charges as defined in the Concession Agreement. As such Authority is not mandated to regulate any Other Charges in respect of the facilities and services provided at the Airport. Accordingly, it's an earnest request that the Fuel charges should be kept outside the regulations. The statement being referred herein in no way supports the stand of oil companies against soft touch The clause referred to in the Supplier's Agreements does not in any way contradict the Soft Touch Stance. However, the clause states that the Final price shall at all times be such price as approved by the Regulator.

Rajiv Gandhi International Airport, Shamshabad, Hyderabad Response to Comments of IOCL, BPCL and HPCL

Comments of IOCL, BPCL and HPCL	GHIAL Response
f) As per pars 17.29 of the Consultation Paper, it has been	Without prejudice to our rights, AERA has considered
proposed by the Authority to accept HIAL submission that	fuel throughput charges as aeronautical revenue in the
the excess yield (calculated on the existing yield and Eligible	consultation paper. As per building block approach,
Yield per kiloliter) being charged in respect of fuel farm	GHIAL is entitled to get aero-nautical revenue as per
services may be considered towards defraying the	the building blocks. So irrespective of what GHIAL is
aeronautical charges for the passengers'.	charging towards Fuel total entitlement remains the
It is noted that the existing tariff of Rs. 2170 per KL is	same.
almost three times the eligible yield per KL Rs.728.40)	
calculated by the Authority, as mentioned in Table90 of the	However we shall like to clarify that the fuel throughput
Consultation Paper. There is a resultant excess charge of	charge is a profit sharing with oil companies and the
Rs.1,441.60 per KL being levied by GHIAL presently. PSU	same should not be passed on to airlines as an airport
Suppliers are of the opinion that such adjustment of excess	charge.
yield from fuel farm service with other aeronautical charges	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
for the passengers, may not be proper, and eligible tariffs	
should only be charged for respective services. This would	
otherwise tantamount to subsidization of other services by	
the fuel farm service.	
9)While on the subject, we would also like to bring to	These are hypothetical statements and cannot be
notice of the Authority the media reports about GHIAL's	commented.
proposal to hive off its Fuel Farm business to a Special	
Purpose Vehicle (SPV) through a slump sale. The fuel-farm	
business will be transferred by GHIAL to the SPV, which will	
then divest 74% stake. As per the reports, the SPV will have	
equity and debt components of Rs. 57 Crore and Rs. 85.56	
Crore respectively, making the asset value as Rs.	
In view of the foregoing, PSU Suppliers – Indian Oil, IBPCL	We are of the view that under AERA acts and under the
and HPCL are as follows:-	concession agreement the Fuel charges are not to be
a) Authority may consider and treat the joint letter ref	regulated.
AV/SSB/GHIAL dated 14th July, (Annexure-II) as objection	
to user agreement with regard to High Fuel Throughput	Also there is nothing on the record to show that a light
Charges at Rajiv Gandhi International Airport, Shamshabad,	touch regulation cannot be mandated by authority.
Hyderabad	
b) The tariffs for fuel farm service provided by HIAL may not	As per 5ection 13(1)(a)(vi) of the AERA Act read with
be determined under light touch approach, as proposed at	Article 10.2 and 10.3 of the Concession Agreement
Para 13.a.iii of the Consultation Paper	mandates regulating the Regulated Charges as defined
c) HIAL submission for considering the excess yield being	in the Concession Agreement. As such Authority is not
charged in respect of fuel farm services towards defraying	mandated to regulate any Other Charges in respect of
the aeronautical charges fur the passengers, may not be	the facilities and services provided at the Airport.
accepted and only the actual lower eligible yield per KL may	
be approved as Fuel Throughput Charge applicable at the	Accordingly, it's an earnest request that the Fuel
airport.	charges should be kept outside the regulations.

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